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A Third Theory of Liberty: The
Evolution of Our Conception of
Freedom in American Constitutional
Thought
by JOHN LAWRENCE HILL*
Our contemporaries are ever a prey to two conflicting passions:
they feel the need of guidance, and they long to stay free. Unable to
wipe out these two contradictory instincts, they try to satisfy them both
together. -Alexis de Tocqueville
Liberty is the central animating value of the American
constitutional order. No concept has exercised so complete a hold on
the normative imagination of a people as has the ideal of freedom in
the American political consciousness. Yet the meaning of liberty as it
has been understood by various schools of political thought remains a
tangled thicket of overlapping and sometimes contradictory notions.2
* John Lawrence Hill is a Professor of Law at St. Thomas University, and Visiting
Professor at Western New England College, School of Law for the school year, 2002-03.
He holds both a J.D. (1988) and a Ph.D. in Philosophy (1989) from Georgetown
University. Professor Hill is completing a book, THE MEANING OF LIBERTY IN
AMERICAN POLITICAL AND LEGAL THOUGHT, which seeks to bridge the gap between
philosophical and legal conceptions in developing a theory of liberty.
1. ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 693 (J.P. Myer ed., 1969).
2. Disputation concerning the meaning of liberty is almost endless. Hayek, for
example, distinguished between a number of different meanings of the term, all of which
he contends, are adulterations of the original concept. He defines liberty as
"independence of the arbitrary will of another." FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 12 (1960). He distinguishes this from a number of
competitors, including political freedom or the right of collective self-determination, inner
or subjective freedom, as with the concept of freedom of the will, liberty as the ability to
do what one wants (which we will describe as a form of positive liberty), and liberty as
power or wealth. Id. at 13-19. Similarly, Tim Gray examined seven distinct conceptions of
liberty, which overlap but expand upon those mentioned above. TIM GRAY, FREEDOM
(1991). These concepts are freedom as absence of constraints, freedom as availability of
choices, freedom as effective power, freedom as social status, freedom as self-
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When Franklin Delano Roosevelt proclaimed that there were four
basic freedoms, which included not only freedom of speech and
worship, but "freedom from want, everywhere in the world" and
"freedom from fear, anywhere in the world,"3 it is difficult to conceive
that he had the same thing in mind as Thomas Jefferson, when he said
that "the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the
blood of patriots and tyrants."' And neither of these sounds
particularly like the libertarian's conception of freedom as the
protection of property rights, freedom of contract and the free
market' or, for that matter, the civic republican ideal of liberty as
collective self-government.6
In modern political thought, our conceptions of liberty have been
framed by a bipolar dichotomy between two supposedly opposed
conceptions of freedom, the "positive" and the "negative" dimensions
of freedom.7 The dichotomy has roots deep in our history and in
determination, freedom as doing what one wants and freedom as self-mastery. Id.
Cutting across many of these definitions is the distinction between negative and positive
liberty, but the distinction between negative and positive liberty has itself been amenable
to considerable variation. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, FOUR ESSAYS ON
LIBERTY (1969) (for the classic discussion of the distinction.) See generally infra section I
for a review and consideration of these concepts.
3. This is from his famous "four freedoms" speech in 1941.
4. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W.S. Smith (Nov. 13, 1787), 12 PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON (1955).
5. See DAVID BOAZ, LIBERTARIANISM: A PRIMER 59-93 (1997) (discussing the
libertarian conception of rights). See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND
UTOPIA (1974); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY (1982); JAN
NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA (1988); RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A
COMPLEX WORLD (1995) (for similar treatment of the libertarian conception of rights).
6. Berlin, supra note 2, at 163-66 (surveying the slippery slope of positive
conceptions of freedom to the idea of liberty as collective sovereignty); see generally
MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT (1998) (for a modern conception of
republican liberty). See generally infra notes 55-60, 64 (examining positive liberty as
collective self-determination).
7. Berlin, supra note 2, at 118-31. There has been a great deal of commentary on
Berlin's essay and his distinction between negative and positive liberty. Perhaps the most
influential is that of Gerald MacCallum. See Gerald C. MacCallum, Negative and Positive
Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312 (1967), reprinted in LIBERTY (David Miller ed., 1991).
MacCallum argues that the distinction is illusory, and that all statements about freedom
take the form, x is free from y to do or to have or to be z. Thus, negative liberals tend to
focus on the "y" variable, which designates the constraint hindering a particular act, while
positive libertarians focus on the "z" factor, the goal variable. Both positive and negative
liberals tend to overlook the more comprehensive nature of our conceptions of liberty.
See also John Gray, On Negative and Positive Liberty, CONCEPTIONS OF LIBERTY: IN
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (J. Gray & C. Pelczynski eds., 1984) (criticizing MacCallum's
triadic formula). The works mentioned here all deal with abstract or formal conceptions
of liberty, and are one step removed from more substantive political philosophy. The
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abstract philosophical theory.8 The distinction crept into political
awareness early in the liberal era. In 1819, the Frenchman, Benjamin
Constant, published what would become his famous essay on the
distinction between the liberty of the ancients and the liberty of the
moderns.9 His thought crystallized classical liberal thought and
influenced such subsequent social and legal philosophers as Alexis de
Tocqueville, ° John Stuart Mill," Isaiah Berlin 2 and Friedrich Hayek, 3
among many others. Constant's distinction between ancient and
modern liberty can be roughly captured as that between self-
government or direct, participatory democracy, on one hand, and
some form of modern negative liberalism, on the other. 4 The liberty
of the moderns, he maintained, includes freedom from arbitrary
arrest and maltreatment at the hands of the authorities, the right to
choose one's own profession, the rights of free speech and assembly,
the right to marry one's choice of partners and the right to religious
freedom, among others. 5 In contrast, the liberty of the ancients
work of these analytic philosophers has set about clarifying the conceptual meaning of
liberty. Nevertheless, there lies a considerable distance between having an abstract
conception of liberty and defending a political system that embodies this conception. Put
simply, there are those who define liberty negatively, even if they are not true liberals at
all. Thomas Hobbes best exemplifies this. He vouchsafed a negative definition of liberty
but was no liberal. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1969) (1651).
8. Friedrich Hayek claimed that the negative/positive distinction derives from Hegel
and was later picked up by T.H. Green. HAYEK, supra note 2, at 425 n. 26. In fact, the
distinction derives from Kant. This is found in the Introduction to Part I of Kant's The
Metaphysics of Morals. IMMANUEL KANT, ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY 12, 26 (James W.
Ellington trans., 1983) (The Metaphysics of Morals in edited form). Kant conceived of
negative and positive liberty both in an internal sense, as qualities of the free will, and in
an external sense, as a function of the actor's relation to the world.
9. BENJAMIN CONSTANT, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared With the Liberty of
the Moderns, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN CONSTANT (1988) (1819).
10. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1.
11. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1985) (1859).
12. Berlin, supra note 2, at 141-68; see also JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN (1998)
(describing Berlin's "agonistic" negative liberalism).
13. HAYEK, supra note 2; see also FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM
(1994) (1944) (for a detailed attack on socialism, the welfare state and modern progressive
liberalism from the standpoint of the classical negative liberalism of Hayek).
14. The distinction between the liberty of the ancients and that of the moderns is
sometimes cast by philosophers as a distinction between positive and negative liberty. See
Berlin, supra note 2 (defending a negative conception of liberty as more consistent with
the presuppositions of liberalism). Charles Taylor has called negative liberty "an
opportunity concept" and positive liberty "an exercise concept." Charles Taylor, What's
Wrong with Negative Liberty, in 2 PHIL. AND THE HUM. SCI.: PHIL. PAPERS 211-29 (1985).
15. CONSTANT, supra note 9, at 310-11. These, of course, are many of the same rights
provided for in our own Bill of Rights, along with the Fourteenth Amendment, either
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consisted in exercising collectively, but directly, several parts of
the complete sovereignty; in deliberating, in the public square,
over war and peace; in forming alliances with foreign
governments; in voting laws; in pronouncing judgments; in
examining the accounts, the acts, the stewardship of the
magistrates, in calling them to appear to the assembled people;
in accusing and absolving them.
Constant concluded that among the ancients, the individual, who
was almost always "sovereign in public affairs, was a slave in all his
private relations."' 7  In obvious contrast, the modern possesses a
range of private liberties that would have been unthinkable for the
ancients but is "sovereign in public life only in appearance."' 8
In the broadest sense, the liberty of the ancients is associated
with a positive conception of liberty; it is the freedom to take part
actively in democratic self-government. In contrast, the liberty of the
moderns has been deemed a negative conception of liberty in that it
equates liberty with freedom from various forms of external
constraint, the freedom to live and do as one wishes within the private
domain.'" The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate the extent to
directly or through the evolution of constitutional case law. Some of these rights are
explicitly protected by the Bill of Rights: e.g., the rights to free speech, assembly and
freedom of religious worship are protected by the First Amendment. Similarly, freedom
from arbitrary arrest and maltreatment are protected by various provisions of the Fourth,
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, along with various clauses within the body of the
Constitution. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting ex postfacto laws and Bills
of Attainder) and U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (providing for the writ of habeas corpus).
The right to marry, on the other hand, has been recognized as a fundamental right by the
courts during the privacy era. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking
down as unconstitutional anti-miscegenation laws). The right is not absolute. See
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 148 (1878) (upholding laws prohibiting polygamy).
Finally, some liberties, such as the right to choose one's profession, have been addressed
indirectly by the courts. See, e.g., Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985)
(privileges and immunities clause prohibits state from limiting bar admissions to state
residents).
16. CONSTANT, supra note 9, at 311.
17. Among the ancients, virtually every facet of personal life was regulated by law,
including religion, custom, marriage, even the appropriate time for coitus. Id. at 314.
18. Id.
19. Berlin, supra note 2 (for the distinction between negative and positive liberty).
Berlin describes negative liberty in the following way:
I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men
interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area in
which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from
doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree, and if this area is
contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being
coerced, or it may be, enslaved.
Id. at 122. Nevertheless, freedom from constraint does not guarantee that the individual
will have the physical, social or economic ability to achieve the object of his action, but
[Vol. 29:
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which both the positive and negative ideals of liberty have failed to
capture the true meaning of liberty as it has evolved in American
constitutional thought. Contemporary conceptions of liberty place
emphasis neither on some positive right to direct participatory
democracy nor a purely negative conception of liberty as enshrined in
the night watchman state of libertarian theory. What has replaced
these ideals is something far more complex - and distinctly American.
This Article will argue that post-revolutionary American politics
fostered the philosophical crystallization of an altogether new concept
of liberty, one that began to transcend the positive/negative
distinctions that even later philosophers and political thinkers would
draw. It will contend that the Founding Fathers and, in particular,
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, drew together the diverse
strands of a number of distinct, if often overlapping traditions, in
creating a theory of liberty which ties the values associated with
individual self-determination to a conception of liberty as social
balance. More specifically, liberty requires the counter-balancing of
all forms of social power, yet this attempt to create an equilibrium of
social power does not simply check power, as in negative theories of
liberty, but serves to create a social foundation for the affirmative
expression and influence of groups, and through them, persons."
While personal liberty is equated with the self-determination of the
individual, our ideas concerning self-determination are in need of
revision. In particular, social pluralism and the decentralization of
social power are considerably more essential to the central liberal
value of self-determination than the liberal tradition has recognized.
One implication of this is that the currently fashionable debate
between liberals and communitarians is misplaced and misconceives
the relationship between autonomy and community. 21
only that he has the opportunity to do so in the sense that he is not prevented by the
intentional acts of human agents from doing so. Thus, Berlin insists that, "[m]ere
incapacity to attain a goal is not lack of political freedom." Id. See also Michael Bayles,
The Concept of Coercion, COERCION 16, 16-29 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1972) (for a systematic elaboration of coercion from the negative standpoint).
Thomas Hobbes developed the first modern explication of this negative ideal. HOBBES,
supra note 7.
20. The article seeks to demonstrate that protecting a diverse and partially de-
centralized political structure is actually conducive to self-determination. Thus, the
Article seeks to give a quasi-libertarian justification for communitarian values. See infra
section II.C. (discussing the significance of de-centralized social and political power to self-
determination.)
21. In this respect, John Stuart Mill saw most clearly the relationship between a plural
culture with decentralized and insulated subcultures, and individual autonomy. MILL,
supra note 11. Not only do distinct subcultures represent experiments in living which
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This Article will argue that the canonical sources for this ideal is
James Madison's conception of liberty, particularly as manifest in the
Federalist Papers, numbers 10 and 51.22 Under modern progressive
liberal influences, Madison's ideas have been given increasingly
broader scope, even as progressives began to question the
applicability of these ideas in the economic sphere.23
Certain strands of contemporary communitarianism also seek to
recapture the Madisonian ideal of freedom in the social sphere.24
Where Madison's thought served as a commentary on the structure of
government, modern influences have extended the model to private
centers of power.
Part One of this Article traces the breakdown of the negative
and positive ideals of liberty essential to classical liberal and
republican thought, respectively. Part Two introduces the
Madisonian ideal of liberty as a distinct conception transcending
negative and positive notions of liberty, and then discusses the
extension of this ideal to private or non-governmental spheres of
social power, particularly the economy. Part Three examines the
development of what will be termed the "homeostatic ideal of
liberty" in recent constitutional developments. Section III.A.
demonstrates how and why the homeostatic conception of freedom
has led to a reconsideration of the liberal distinction between public
and private power. Section III.B examines the modern emphasis on
others can follow, or not, according to the success of each, but alternate sub-cultures
permit the exploration of different modes of being, different identities. Mill viewed this as
a means to matching one's authentic identity with one's social environment, of finding a
"fit" between individual and society with the microcosm of any of a plethora of distinct
subcultures.
22. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison) (Fletcher Wright ed., 1961); see
also infra section II.A.
23. In particular, progressives continue to question the idea that the mere neutrality
of the state is sufficient to ensure diversity. In some cases, affirmative government
intervention may be necessary to continue to guarantee social and political diversity. In
this respect, progressives are pitted against both libertarian and communitarian
conceptions of politics. Government intervention and centralized power are viewed as
necessary ingredients of the modern liberal ideal. Moreover, since progressives tend to
hold that private power, particularly economic power, is itself a prevailing problem that
must be countered by government, they contend for greater intervention by government
here as well. See JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927) (for the classic
discussion of these issues from a progressive standpoint); T.H. Green, Liberal Legislation
and Freedom of Contract, in LIBERTY (David Miller ed., 1991) (for one of the earliest
progressive critiques of the doctrine of freedom of contract).
24. William A. Galston, Pluralism and Social Unity, 99 ETHICS 712 (1989); WILLIAM
A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL
STATE (1991); MARK E. WARREN, DEMOCRACY AND ASSOCIATION (2001).
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privacy as a mediating value between the intimate domain of personal
identity and the sphere of public power. Sections III.C., D. and E.
examine the central conflict of modern liberalism. This is the
precarious balance between a commitment to social pluralism, which
is itself necessary to the homeostatic ideal, and the recent emphasis
on equality, central to more contemporary forms of progressivism.
This part of the Article discusses the ways in which a commitment to
individual self-determination is the central animating value of
constitutional liberalism, and argues that social pluralism is essential
to this value. The homeostatic ideal of liberty charts a middle course
between classical liberalism's embrace of negative liberty and the
progressive's dubious defense of centralized power in the name of
individual rights. The value of self-determination, properly
understood, requires considerably more than both the absence of
government and the omnipresence of the state; it requires a
reinvigorated commitment to creating conditions of diversity and
balance among intermediate social groups.
I. The Breakdown of Negative and Positive
Conceptions of Liberty
A. Negative Liberty: From Classical to Progressive Liberalism
The classical liberal model of liberty in its purest form dominated
nineteenth century constitutional and common law jurisprudential
thought. The classical liberal influence is evident in frequent appeals,
most often by courts during the period, to notions of natural rights
and natural justice, and to the idea that there exist inherent moral
limits on the power of the legislature.25 Because many of the
challenges to legislative supremacy during this period were directed
at state laws, and because the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states
until after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868,26
challengers often successfully appealed to various clauses of state
constitutions. 27 Nevertheless, at the federal level, first the Contracts
25. Notions of natural law and natural justice are usually central to these government-
limiting arguments. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) (Chase, J., concurring) (arguing
that there exist limits to legislative authority imposed by "the great first principles of the
social compact"). See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT
(1948) (for the classic treatment of the rise and fall of the negative conception of liberty in
constitutional law).
26. See Barron v. Mayor, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights was never
originally intended to reach state laws).
27. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 306-50 (1996) (discussing the
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clause of Article I, section 10,28 and later the Due Process Clause29
were most commonly relied upon to set aside state and federal laws
deemed to violate fundamental principles of limited government and
natural justice. It was during the Lochner era, which roughly spanned
the years 1897 to 1937, that libertarian theory reached its zenith in
constitutional law. 3' The Supreme Court struck down a series of laws,
including maximum hour and minimum wage laws, laws restricting
entry into a profession and a variety of laws deemed to have re-
distributive consequences.3
If we could distill the central elements of the negative liberal
tradition, as embodied in the foregoing developments, they would
include the following: First, liberty itself was conceived as the absence
of constraint and, more particularly, the absence of government
regulation. Negative liberals followed Bentham in maintaining that
"every law is an infraction of liberty."32 Second, as a consequence,
evolution of states' Bills of Rights); PAGE SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION: A
DOCUMENTARY AND NARRATIVE HISTORY 55-70 (1978) (discussing the kinds of rights
protected under them).
28. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810) (invalidating a state law that
rescinded a land grant and undermining a contract entered into in good faith by
subsequent purchaser); Sturges v. Croninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819) (invalidating a New
York law that relieved debtors of obligations imposed by contract upon surrender of their
property); but see Ogden v. Sanders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827) (upholding a state bankruptcy law
against a claim that it impaired a contract). In Sanders Justice Marshall dissented, arguing
that positive law could not alter the natural right to contract. Id. at 221. According to one
commentator, during the nineteenth century, the contracts clause "was the constitutional
justification for more cases involving the validity of state law than all of the other clauses
of the Constitution together." BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1938).
29. Ironically, the first case to rely upon the due process clause as a substantive,
rather than procedural protection, was the infamous Dred Scott decision. This case held
that slave owners had due process rights in the "property" consisting of their slaves. Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). See generally Edward Corwin, The Doctrine of Due
Process Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366 (1911) (discussing development of the
doctrine before adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment).
30. The period is named for the famous Lochner case. Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905). See also Charles Warren, The New Liberty Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 26 HARV. L. REV. 431 (1926). For a modern view, see Cass Sunstein,
Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
31. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating state prohibition of
"yellow dog" contracts, requiring employee's agreement that he will not join a union);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (same); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 565
(1923) (striking minimum wage law for women); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S.
235 (1929) (striking price regulations on gasoline); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262 (1932) (striking licensing requirement for ice makers); Louis K. Liggett Co. v.
Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928) (striking licensing requirement for pharmacists).
32. JEREMY BENTHAM. INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF MORALS AND
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rights were inevitably viewed as pre-political in character: They
represented the sphere of activity which the individual reserved to
himself upon entering the social contract.33 Third, following from the
first two core commitments of classical liberalism, rights had to be
conceived as negative in character; in other words, the individual did
not have rights to affirmative government assistance but rather, had
the right to be let alone in achieving for himself, or in voluntary
combination with others, his legitimate ends. Fourth, the individual
was himself viewed as autonomous - as capable of reasoning and
freely choosing his own purposes and ends. As a result, negative
liberals are highly skeptical of both redistributive and paternalistic
state interests. Finally, together these commitments entail the
acceptance of a strong distinction between public and private spheres
of activity. The public realm is that of government regulation and is
associated with the view that all laws necessarily are coercive. The
private realm is the sphere of voluntary association that encompasses
the rest of civil society: families, religious and political organizations,
financial and employment relations - all of these were the sphere of
consensual relations that provide both a bulwark against
governmental tyranny and a realm of private satisfaction and pursuit.
The negative conception of liberty began to break down during
the last few decades of the nineteenth century and has increasingly
become known as the "conservative" branch of modern liberal
theory.' Indeed, the ambiguity of the terms "liberal" and
''conservative" today bespeak the tenuous connection between
modern and classical forms of liberalism.35 Under the withering
attack of social progressives and legal realists, the various core
elements of classical liberalism were replaced with a distinct notion of
liberty.36 As an initial matter, progressives pointed out that negative
LEGISLATION (1789).
33. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1980) (1690).
34. See HAYEK, supra note 2, at 397-411, entitled Why I Am Not A Conservative
(arguing that the term "liberalism" as it is now used is increasingly associated with socialist
values and that adherence to the classical liberal model promotes change, progress and
other true "liberal" values better than modern progressive ideals.)
35. See HAYEK, supra note 13, at xxxv-xxxvi (1944) (discussing the change in the
meaning of the term "liberalism"); Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE (1985) (comparing modern conservatives and liberals); Edward Shils, The
Antinomies of Liberalism, THE RELEVANCE OF LIBERALISM (1978) (for an excellent and
elegant treatment of the change in meanings of "liberal" and "liberalism" from classical to
"collectivist" versions).
36. Shils, supra note 35; see also L.T. HOBHOUSE, LIBERALISM 63-73 (1974) (1911)
(comparing the changing notions of liberty in classical and progressive conceptions).
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liberty could not always be equivalent to non-interference by
government - even on the classical liberal's own definition. The
reason for this is that classical liberals required government
intervention to protect rights to property and personhood. In other
words, if negative liberty includes property and contract rights,
among others, and if such rights themselves required government
protection and enforcement, as they do, then negative liberty must at
least sometimes require intervention on the part of government. And
if the state should intervene to protect these rights, then why not
others such as the right, for example, of individuals not to be
constrained by employers in forming associations for purposes of
collective bargaining? Put simply, negative liberals were not able to
provide a non-controversial theory of civil (as opposed to political)
rights " that could generate only the kinds of rights they preferred -
i.e., property and contract rights. Progressives argued that, implicitly,
even the negative liberal accepted the need for government
intervention to protect rights. The question was then shifted to a
distinct issue: Which rights should be protected by government or,
which activities should be protected as rights?
Thus, the second and third commitments of classical liberalism
were challenged as well. Rights were political in nature, according to
progressive and legal realist theory, in the sense that they were
structured, interpreted and enforced through the legal system."
37. Negative political rights represent freedom from government interference, while
negative civil rights represent a right to be free from interference from all of society.
Constitutional rights are negative political rights in that they protect the individual only
from government interference in the exercise of the right. Constitutional protection of
freedom of speech is a negative political right, but not a negative civil right, in that a
corporation or other private entity need not observe the right. On the other hand,
property and contract are civil rights in that the government not only must not interfere in
their legitimate exercise, it must affirmatively intervene to assist the individual when such
rights are threatened by a third party. Different thinkers sometimes use slightly varying
terms to describe this distinction. Corwin, for example calls these "civil" and "juridical"
rights. CORWIN, supra note 25, at 1-9. At some point, as we expand the number of
negative civil rights, they will conflict with negative political rights, since the former
require government intervention in ways that may interfere with the claims of negative
political rights. It is for this reason that libertarian thinkers limit the number of negative
civil rights to a very limited number, usually property, contract and associated rights. For
example, there is no right to be free of private discrimination on libertarian accounts.
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 108-18 (1962); BOAZ, supra note 5, at
228-33.
38. This conception of rights was a positivist, as opposed to a natural law, idea.
Rights were political or legal creations; they were not the residue of personal freedom in
the state of nature. For this reason, Oliver Wendell Holmes always maintained that rights
were the conclusions of any syllogistic legal reasoning, and not merely the premises - i.e.,
[Vol. 29:
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Moreover, since few liberals accepted the idea that the social contract
was a historical reality rather than a theoretical fiction, even the
contract and property rights preferred by classical liberals could not
be privileged as pre-political in the sense that actual persons once
came together to safeguard these purportedly pre-existing rights. And
if rights required government intervention both to create and to
enforce them, then the positive right/negative right distinction was
similarly on conceptual thin ice.
The distinction between negative and positive rights is
represented by the difference between government neutrality, in the
case of negative rights, and government assistance, in the case of
positive rights. To take one recent example, Roe v. Wade" created a
negative right to abortion by prohibiting government from criminally
sanctioning abortion, but it did not create a positive right to
affirmative government assistance in paying for an abortion, as
subsequent cases have established.' Increasingly, progressive
legislation insulated the individual from a wide array of limitations on
social liberty that would not be ameliorated under the older negative
model. Minimum wage and maximum hour laws, collective
bargaining rights, civil rights legislation, workers' safety rules and a
plethora of other reforms have blurred the line between the old
positivist distinction between rights as liberties (rights in the pure
negative sense) and rights as entitlements or privileges." If
government could intervene to protect rights, it could intervene to
create them and, in doing so, could affirmatively re-structure social
relations in a manner designed to maximize the individual's social
liberty.42
they were the result of legal judgments, not a pre-existing presupposition of the legal
system. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE PATH OF THE LAW (1897). This view was
shared by those of his contemporaries and subsequent thinkers who became known as
legal realists. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine
of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 135 (1893); Morris R. Cohen, Property and
Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8 (1927); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and
the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Id.; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that there was no
constitutional right to Medicaid payments for an abortion); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977) (upholding similar state law).
41. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right/Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private
Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96
YALE L. J. 1006 (1987).
42. See Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923) (arguing that regulation can maximize freedom by ordering
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The fourth commitment of classical liberalism - the idea that
persons are autonomous and capable of looking out for themselves in
their social and economic relations - was the next to come under
attack. Progressives were ambivalent regarding the idea of
autonomy; they understood that an outright rejection of the ideal
might be destructive of liberalism in any form. Yet they increasingly
argued for the need for a wide array of paternalistic legislation to
protect individuals from their own presumably non-autonomous
choices.43  This ambivalence continues to the present day. '
Government intervention was thus increasingly justified in the name
of liberty, but a liberty that progressively required that the
government protect the individual from himself.45
Finally, the fifth pillar of the classical liberal model was under
siege. Even on the classical model, liberty was not purely political in
nature: Civil rights are necessary as embodiments of our desire to
protect various social liberties to the extent that persons must be
protected from other individuals. Since progressives viewed not
simply government but all social relations as potentially liberty-
limiting - e.g., since the dramatically underpaid worker or the weaker
party to the contract of adhesion were subject to very real restrictions
on their liberty, at least as progressives understood the term-
society).
43. See Green, supra note 23. Written in the 1880s, Green's liberalism presaged
progressivism and argued that the freedom of contract should be limited on paternalistic
grounds.
44. DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS
OF BENEVOLENCE (1986); THE NEW PATERNALISM: SUPERVISORY APPROACHES TO
POVERTY (Lawrence Mead ed., 1997) (recounting the progressively more paternalistic
approaches in welfare policy); Cass Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986) (arguing, inter alia, that the idea of personal autonomy
cannot be dispensed with altogether, yet holding that many preferences that can be traced
to social influences may not be autonomous); Anthony Kronman, Paternalism in Contract,
92 YALE L. REV. 763 (1983) (justifying some paternalistic limits to contract law in
contexts where full autonomy of choice is questionable).
45. Paternalism literally requires that a person be restrained for his own good. In
some cases, this good was itself conceived in terms of liberty. For example, though John
Stuart Mill was notoriously opposed to paternalism, he argued that there might exist
extreme cases, such as his example of a man being restrained from accidentally walking off
a bridge. Mill argued that the man's liberty in this case could be restrained for the sake of
the greater share of liberty he would enjoy having been saved from death. Progressives
leapt upon this idea, arguing that many other personal decisions - e.g. , to use heroin for
the first time - could be regulated on grounds that they would diminish the individual's
freedom to make other choices in the long term. Of course, this leads rather directly to a
slippery slope where every such decision might be second-guessed in the name of liberty.
See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF (1986) (for in-depth philosophical examination of
autonomy and paternalism).
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government should intervene within the private domain to restructure
social relations where they are destructive to personal liberty.
Those who took part in the two waves of modern progressivism
in the twentieth century - the workers' movement that spanned the
first three decades of the twentieth century and the civil rights
movement of the 1950s and 60s - each viewed their ultimate goals not
only in terms of the well-being or the equality of the individual, but in
terms of general social liberty. Moreover, the legal realists argued
that the public/private distinction itself was bogus because public
force through law was used to preserve private power structures
within the family, the business and elsewhere.46 The public and the
private, the political and the social, were intimately intertwined,
according to progressive accounts. For similar reasons, progressives
rejected the distinction between social and political inequality which
had been so essential to the reasoning of decisions such as Plessy v.
Ferguson.47 Brown v. Board of Education48 explicitly rejected the idea
that political (public) segregation and social (private) inequality were
functionally independent of one another.
Underlying these developments, a still deeper philosophical
transition in the American ideal of liberty was taking place. The idea,
most basically, was that liberty is limited by the maldistribution of
social power rather than by coercion as the concept was understood
by classical liberals. Since progressives held that power exists "in all
social spaces," as the postmodernist Michel Foucault would later
say,' the public/private distinction could not be relied upon as a
model for protecting the liberty of the individual. As the classical
liberal model began to break down, progressives searched for a new
unifying conception of liberty. Some continued to conceive of liberty
vaguely as a new kind of negative liberty - a liberty from various
46. Hale, supra note 42; CATHERINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE (1989) (extending the critique to intimate relationships).
47. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Throughout the majority Plessy opinion written by Justice
Brown, the Court argues that the law can do nothing about social inequality - i.e., that, as
long as the law treats all parties equally as a formal matter, it has done all that is required
under the Equal Protection clause.
48, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Chief Justice Warren's argument is that "[t]o separate [black
children] from others of similar age and qualification solely because of their race generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way never likely to be undone." Id. at 494. Legal distinctions conduce to social
distinctions and vice versa. The private effect of public regulations cannot be gainsaid.
49. Michel Foucault, quoted in POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE 168 (Lawrence D.
Kritzman ed.. 1988).
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forms of social intrusion." These thinkers followed an essentially
voluntaristic conception of liberty as autonomous choice transplanted
into the new world of the large corporation and an impersonal
bureaucracy." Freedom came to mean negative social liberty -
freedom from various forms of meddling in a range of personal
decisions. The rise of modern notions of privacy, both in tort law52
and in constitutional law,53 are thus connected to the older liberal
tradition by the idea that the government must protect the individual
not only from government itself, but from other forms of social
intrusion.
The disintegration of the concept of negative liberty resulted
from conceiving freedom increasingly as a social, rather than merely a
political ideal. Consequently, the number of liberties were expanded
so that the role of government in protecting the individual from the
rest of society was dramatically enlarged. At the same time, more
egalitarian ideals influenced our ideas concerning the potentially
liberty-limiting effects of power. Power was viewed as destructive of
negative social liberty even where it was not accompanied by coercion
or violence. This resulted in more frequent collisions between the
expanding number of competing rights. For example, modern public
accommodations statutes, which prohibit discrimination on the basis
of race in public places of business, may be viewed as resolving the
clash between the businessman's purported negative right to do
business with whomever he chooses-to turn away the business of the
African-American customer, for example-and the customer's
claimed negative right to do business with whomever he chooses and
not to be denied service on the basis of his skin color. In similar
fashion, collective bargaining issues juxtapose the claimed negative
50. John Stuart Mill was arguably the single most important liberal thinker in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, whose philosophy straddles the classical liberal and
the modern progressive ideals. While Mill sometimes appears to be a classical liberal
because of his adherence to a negative conception of political liberty, his negative
liberalism was significantly mitigated by two additional themes in the body of his writing.
First, while political liberty was negative, Mill followed Kant, rather than Hobbes, in
holding that personal liberty was a matter of positive liberty; i.e., it represents a capacity to
exercise one's choice, rather than simply having a formal opportunity to do so. Second,
Mill made the move from a conception of negative liberty that included social, as well as
political, interference. Thus, Millian liberalism paved the way for the progressives, even as
he appeared to stand on classical liberal principles. MILL, supra note 11.
51. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
52. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
53. The modern privacy era in constitutional law began with Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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right of the business owner to fire those who engage in union activity
against the asserted negative rights of workers to associate for
purposes of labor organization. Under the old classical liberal model,
each of these conflicts would be resolved in favor of the business
owner because, in the absence of violence or direct coercion, the
government should not intervene. Yet, once negative liberty came to
embrace social as well as political interference, workers might claim a
"negative" right to associate - as against the interference of
employers - while minorities could claim that a denial of service was
an abuse of the social power. In sum, the problem of balancing rights
led to the wholesale breakdown of the negative model as it was
understood by classical liberals. In place of the negative ideal,
modern liberalism has arrived at a very different idea of liberty
altogether.54
The next section explores the idea of "positive liberty"" as
collective self-government, an ideal of liberty closely associated
historically with the civic republican tradition.
B. Positive Liberty as Self-Government in American Constitutional
Law
In the deepest sense, there has never been a tradition of pure
positive liberty, conceived as genuine participatory democratic self-
government, in American legal history. Indeed, the reality of self-
government in this sense was lost to history even before the
Macedonians overran the ancient Greek city-states.56 Positive liberty,
54. Modern liberalism, both more egalitarian and re-distributive in character,
conceives of liberty as a qualitatively more "positive" value - i.e., positive in the sense that
liberty is more than the mere absence of constraint, embracing the idea that freedom
means capacity to achieve what one wants, with the state's assistance in some cases. JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Dworkin, supra note 35.
55. There are actually three senses in which the term "positive liberty" is used by
lawyers and philosophers. In addition to the two senses discussed here, positive liberty
sometimes is used by moral philosophers to designate a state of will or character similar to
individual autonomy. Positive liberty in this sense is neither an entitlement concept nor a
juridical right, such as the right to take part in democratic self-government. Rather, it
represents the capacity of the individual to govern himself and to achieve his reasoned
goals. Positive liberty in this sense is distinguished from Kant's idea of heteronomous
behavior, where the individual acts volitionally, but not rationally. IMMANUEL KANT,
GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (1997). See also ALAN GERWERTH,
REASON AND MORALITY (1978) (for a modern defense of the ideal). Charles Taylor,
What's Wrong with Negative Liberty and Kant's Theory of Freedom in his Philosophical
Papers. While this third sense of the term is important in philosophical and political
thought, it has only indirect import to constitutional theory.
56. See PAUL A. RAHE, REPUBLICS: ANCIENT AND MODERN (1994) (for an
excellent treatment of ancient Greek politics). HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN
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in this purest sense of the ideal, is Constant's liberty of the ancients; it
is the right of the citizen to take part fully in every manner of public
activity - to have a role in the legislative, executive and judicial
aspects of government. It is, as a contemporary republican thinker
has put it, participatory politics at its most "immediate."57
While a great deal of recent scholarship has argued that there
existed a strong civic republican element in the founding of the
American republic,58 American republicanism never seriously sought
to resurrect a system of participatory democracy on the Greek model,
even at the level of the states. While American republicans during
the revolutionary period were fond of quoting Cicero, Tacitus, Seneca
and other republican thinkers of classical antiquity, even these
Roman thinkers had given up the idea of full, direct political
participation in favor of representative models of government under
the Roman constitution. 9 Thus, when American republicans set
about the very practical activity of framing a model of government,
they were influenced not by the Greeks or Romans, but by such
English republican thinkers of the seventeenth century as James
Harrington, Algernon Sidney, John Milton and others.' ° This modern
brand of republican thought replaced the idea of direct political
participation with notions of mixed government, rotation in
representation, and an essentially liberal defense of property rights as
essential to free government. While vestiges of direct participation in
government appeared in the American system of government, they
were exceptions. The most salient example is that of the right to a
jury trial which, on republican accounts, is not intended primarily to
give the criminal defendant protection from the state, but to give
jurors a role in government and to make prosecutions conform to
CONDITION pt., 1 (1958) (for a modern philosophical exegesis of the ancient ideal of
freedom as the vita activa).
57. Frank Michelman, Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REV 4
(1986).
58. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787
(1968); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); SANDEL, supra note 6.
59. CICERO, THE REPUBLIC AND THE LAWS (Niall Rudd trans., 1998). Indeed,
Cicero extolled the aristocratic nature of the Roman constitution and argued that the
decline and drift into dictatorship began with the democratic reforms associated with the
Gracchi in the second-century BCE.
60. See Z.S. FINK, THE CLASSICAL REPUBLICANS (1945); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIEVELLIAN MOMENT (1975) (arguing that late Florentine and Venetian
republicanism greatly influenced the seventeenth century English republican thinkers
who, in turn, influenced American thought).
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popular mores." Positive liberty never meant full participation in
politics in American legal history.
In Federalist 39,62 James Madison signaled the transition in
American republican thought. A republic did not require full positive
liberty in its pristine sense. Rather, a republic was simply:
a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly
from the great body of the people, and is administered by
persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited
period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such
government that it be derived from the great body of the
society, not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored
class of it... It is sufficient for such a government that the
persons administering it be appointed, either directly or
indirectly by the people.63
On modern republican accounts, the idea of direct participation
has given way to that of representation by the people's officers and,
with it, the republican commitment to positive liberty has been
transformed into the modern idea of popular sovereignty. People are
positively free in this degraded sense of the term if they have a role in
selecting public representatives who are to carry out the public will. '
This right of representation in American government has steadily
become more inclusive throughout history even as it has grown
thinner as a substantive matter. The Constitution itself nowhere
mentions the right to vote65 and the Constitutional Convention left to
the several states the decision as to who would have the right to
vote.& Of course, most states reserved the right to white male
property owners. This obviously gave this more homogeneous group
a greater share of power, particularly in state elections. By the 1840s,
however, most states had extended the franchise to non-property
holders.6 The ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 gave
61. See infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text, for a discussion of both the
republican and the power-diluting conception of the jury.
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) (Benjamin Wright ed., 1961).
63. Id.
64. This is positive liberty in a "degraded" sense from the perspective of republicans
who value the direct participation or input of the individual. Thus, in The Social Contract,
Rousseau emphatically contended that "the moment a people allows itself to be
represented, it is no longer free; it no longer exists." JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE DISCOURSES 265 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1973) (1762).
65. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Electors, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (which first recognized the
right to vote as a fundamental interest protected under the Equal Protection clause).
66. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
401-06 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966).
67. Twelve of the original thirteen states adopted property requirements for voting.
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the vote to black males, while the Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in
1920, extended the vote to women. In 1913, the Seventeenth
Amendment made the election of United States senators a matter of
popular vote. (Senators had previously been elected by the
representatives from the various states.) A second, though less
dramatic, wave of expansion came in the 1960s and 70s, when the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment prohibited the use of poll taxes in
federal elections, and a Supreme Court case extended this to state
elections two years later. 68 The elimination of the poll tax represents
the death knell to limitations on the right to vote predicated upon
indigence; with it died the last vestiges of the same rationale used to
justify the property requirement early in our history. Finally, in 1971,
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment gave the vote to eighteen year-olds.
Underlying the extension of the franchise to a diversity of groups
was the notion that, for democracy adequately to gauge the public
will, all affected groups must be able to register their social interests
as an "input" in the process.69 Direct participation of the few, as a
republican ideal, has been replaced in the American constitutional
order by the indirect but inclusive representation of all. Liberty, even
among modern republicans, is primarily social, rather than political,
in nature. Where the ancient idea of participation in government
required, as Hannah Arendt put it, the vita activa, an active life in
political participation, the modern ideal of broad civic inclusion is
intended as a means to protect the interests of every class. 70 "Under
no circumstances," says Arendt of the ancient ideal of positive liberty,
could politics be only a means to protect society - a society of
(Pennsylvania never imposed the requirement.) All other states admitted to the union did
not bar voters on the basis of property ownership. Of the twelve states that did impose the
requirement, Delaware was the first to eliminate its property requirement in 1792.
Virginia and North Carolina were the last to eliminate it in 1850 and 1854, respectively.
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, table A3 (2000).
68. Harper, 383 U.S. at 663.
69. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1981).
70. Indeed, mainstream liberals, modern republicans and those interested in the
voting rights of minorities all assume that the democratic process is "skewed" where
certain interests are not adequately represented as an "input" in the political process. Id.
at 73-88 (defending a "representation-reinforcing" conception of the constitution); LANI
GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994) (race-conscious districting and other measures
necessary to promote full civic inclusion of minorities); Cass Sunstein, "Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1552-58 (1988) (arguing that political equality
requires the full representation of all, the reduction in influences brought about by wealth
and full citizenship to all).
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the faithful, as in the Middle Ages, or a society of the property-
owners, as in Locke, or a society relentlessly engaged in a
process of acquisition, as in Hobbes, or a society of producers,
as in Marx, or a society of jobholders, as in our own society, or a
society of laborers, as in socialist and communist countries. In
all of these cases ... [f]reedom is located in the realm of the
social .... What all Greek philosophers, no matter how opposed
to polis life, took for granted is that freedom is exclusively
located in the political realm ..."
In marked contrast, the modern republican ideal, as a leading
defender has put it, ultimately concerns "deliberation in the service of
social justice" requiring "full civic inclusion.""' In this respect, among
others, modern republican and liberal ideals are considerably closer
to one another than is sometimes thought. 3
Even as this expansion in voting rights was taking place,
however, the relative domain over which it operated was decreasing.
The power of the vote was diminished due principally to three
sweeping constitutional developments that have marked the
twentieth century. Most important among these is the decline of
federalism itself. The old republican and antifederalist idea that the
states provided citizens with a forum for political expression,74 and
even the old liberal idea that the states would serve as "laboratories"
in which to test diverse programs and policies,75 faded under the crush
of centralization that dramatically accelerated with the New Deal. If,
as Justice Scalia has argued, federalism provides "more choice" than
that which is possible under a uniform national standard, then
71. ARENDT, supra note 56, at 31.
72. Sunstein, supra note 70, at 1550-51.
73. Most modern republican ideas partake of the individualistic assumptions
characteristic of modern liberalism. In this respect, contemporary republican thought
follows modern political thought generally in its rejection of what we might call
"ontological collectivism," the idea that the state or society has a reality greater than that
of the sum of individuals. Compare Aristotle's claim that "the state is by nature prior to
the individual" in that the individual is merely a part of a much greater whole, with
modern republican sentiments that, as Jefferson said, "the rights of the whole can be no
more than the sum of the rights of individuals." DAVID N. MAYER, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 76 (1994). Where the public good
is more than the sum of individual interests on more collectivist conceptions of
republicanism, this is not the case for most modern defenders of republicanism.
74. HERBERT STORING, WHAT THE ANTIFEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1986); THE
COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST (H. Storing ed., 1981).
75. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(linking federalism to experimentation in policy-making and chastising conservative
justices for using the Lochner economic due process right: to stay experimentation at the
state level). In this case, it was the progressives who sought to advance the right of states
as against the rights generated by the old negative liberalism.
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centralization can only be greeted with a sense of profound loss by
those with republican sensibilities. (It is ironic, then, that some who
call themselves "civic republicans" today are champions of
nationalism and centralization.76) The decline of federalism and the
rise of political and economic nationalism represent the most
significant factors in the dilution of positive liberty-even in the very
extended sense in which citizens of any representative democracy
may be said to possess it.
Second, the rise of the administrative state served to insulate
from electoral pressures what in effect became a fourth branch of
government." Increasingly, decisions of a quasi-legislative nature
were made by unelected bureaucrats in a diversity of minute areas
affecting every area of life including, among many others, worker's
safety, consumer affairs, banking, the environment, energy, taxes,
immigration, highway safety and health.
Policy-making has become, as Theodore Lowi has remarked, the
function of a three-way bargaining process between unelected
administrators, a few interested politicians and representatives of the
affected industries." While the growth of the administrative state is
typically viewed as a tradeoff of indirect political control by the
citizenry in return for expertise, efficiency and coverage (i.e., that
Congress lacks the knowledge, the resources and the time to be able
to meet the growing need for administrative management of the
diverse areas of modern industrial life), there can be no doubt that
the administrative state represents virtually the opposite end of the
philosophical spectrum from that of the polis, from the standpoint of
a commitment to positive liberty.
Finally, the expanded role of the judiciary, particularly in
constitutional jurisprudence, represents the third significant way in
which the power of the vote has been diminished, particularly with
respect to state laws. Indeed, over the course of the latter two-thirds
of the twentieth century, from the end of the Lochner era on, patterns
of judicial deference and those of judicial intervention have both
ironically undermined positive liberty in American political life.
Judicial deference to federal authority, as evidenced by the expansion
of the commerce power, has cut against the autonomy of the states,
76. Cass Sunstein comes first to mind. See Sunstein, supra note 70.
77. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-
1960 213-46 (1992) (describing the rise of the bureaucratic state).
78. THEODORE Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1978).
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leaving little beyond the reach of federal power.79 At the same time,
judicial intervention, on constitutional grounds, in various areas of
state law, represents a significant incursion into the values of positive
liberty as embodied in the rights of citizens of the various states to
make law reflecting their distinctive attitudes and mores. While we
applaud at least some of the latter developments - e.g., the protection
of racial minorities from discrimination that took place under color of
state law - we must understand that we do so in the name of another
ideal of liberty. The dark side of any positive liberty of a majority of
citizens to make laws is precisely the "tyranny of the majority" about
which Tocqueville and other liberals warned."0
To the extent that we understand judicial intervention to be
necessary to liberty, we do so in the name of a unique conception of
liberty quite distinct from that of either the positive ideal, either in its
pure participatory form or in its modern degraded sense, or negative
liberty.
II. The Madisonian Moment:
Origins of the Homeostatic Ideal of Liberty
A third conception of freedom, one that transcends the
dichotomy between negative and positive liberty, lies at the heart of
the American concept of liberty. James Madison was the first to
begin to elaborate the ideal in inchoate form, though subsequent
developments have extended his conception of liberty to spheres of
activity distinct from those which Madison himself contemplated."' In
contrast to negative and positive definitions of liberty in which
freedom is conceived primarily as personal or social, on one hand,
and political, on the other, this concept of liberty straddles the public
and private realms: liberty is a personal, social and political ideal,
though it will be achieved in different realms by diverse means. What
is centrally important to this conception is that, in contrast to negative
definitions of liberty, personal liberty is dependent upon the existence
of certain affirmative social and political conditions. Liberty requires
more than the mere absence of coercive authority. Moreover, in
contrast to positive definitions, the American ideal of liberty
79. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The Lopez case represents
the modern limit to this process of nationalism and centralization. United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
80. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 250-53.
81. See infra section II.C. for an overview of these developments.
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embraces considerably more (and considerably less) than the right to
participate in government in some direct fashion. This third theory of
liberty requires self-determination of the person, but the conception
of self-determination will entail the need for specific social conditions
necessary to its realization.
To begin at the most abstract level, let us simply sketch the
elements of this theory, which we will call the "homeostatic"
conception of liberty. Where conceptions of liberty that presuppose a
distinction between negative and positive ideals are held, democracy
and rights will always appear in fundamental tension with one
another. As we have seen, democracy is usually viewed as a form of
positive liberty in which the individual takes part in the collective
regulation of the social and political world, while liberal rights are
viewed as negative limits on the democratic principle. In contrast, the
homeostatic ideal views democracy and rights as serving an identical
purpose. Ultimately, the purpose is to preserve what we might call a
"dynamic stability" in the structure of society. This is not, however,
stability for stability's sake alone. Rather, there is a normative ideal
that lies at the heart of this conception of stability - an ideal
adumbrated, but left partially open, by Madison. The stability sought
by defenders of the homeostatic model is one that is just, that is
conducive to the public good and preservative of private right, and
that represents a proper balancing of interests within society. Exactly
what this balance should be is ambiguous on Madison's model,
though we will see that Madison left a number of distinct indications
of the proper balance. More recent developments have given us a
more determinate principle for measuring this social balance.
Moreover, in any given political or social context, there must
exist a diversity of interests which offset and counter-balance one
another. In the political sphere, this diversity of interest is created by
the constitutional structure of government itself and, more
specifically, by the system of checks and balances, and by federalism.
In the social sphere, the diversity is represented by the plurality of
interest groups which seek to influence government and, in a more
general way, by the diversity of sub-cultures within civil society
generally. In each sphere, this diversity of interests serves in various
ways to preserve liberty. In the liberal tradition, four distinct species
of argument have been made that serve to link diversity to liberty and
to social progress.
First, in both the political and social realms, a diversity of
interests serves to counter-balance one another to prevent too great a
concentration of power in the hands of any one particular set of
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interests, a possibility that would be destructive of diversity and
liberty itself.82 In sum, diversity prevents tyranny, the unjust and
arbitrary exercise of monopolized power. This conception of the
relationship between liberty, diversity and power has passed into the
liberal tradition via English Whig thought from its original source:
republican philosophy. 3
Second, diversity functions in the social context to offer a large
measure of choice to individuals. As we will argue later, personal
self-determination requires not simply the absence of constraint on
the negative model, but a diversity of realistic options in order for the
individual to have a genuine choice. This aspect of diversity is of
more recent vintage in the liberal tradition; negative liberals have
disagreed regarding whether diversity is essential to any true ideal of
negative libertyY
82. James Madison's Federalist 10 and 51 have a parallel theme in this respect.
Federalist 10 concerns the balancing of social power by groups as they seek to affect
government, and 51 deals explicitly with checks and balances in government. THE
FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51, supra note 22. See also MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE
LAWS 155 (Anne M. Cohler et al. trans., 1989) ("So that one cannot abuse power, power
must check power by the arrangement of things.")
83. The need to dilute power was a regular theme in English republican thought of
the seventeenth century. Perhaps the greatest exponent of this view was James
Harrington. JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA AND A SYSTEM
OF POLITICS (J.C.A. Pocock ed., 2001). The central aspect of Harrington's thought, in this
respect, was the idea that "dominion follows property," and that a wide distribution of
property serves as a check upon tyranny. This focus on the relationship between property
(or, more generally, economic power) and political power is one of a number of central
themes that link English republicanism with later libertarian thought and with Madisonian
liberal-republicanism.
The idea that power must be diluted is of even more ancient vintage in the
republican tradition. Older republican thought holds that there must be a rough balance
between the democratic, aristocratic and monarchical principles (and interests) in
societies. Without this balance, the theory holds, societies tend to cycle through
degenerate forms of each of the three types of government. In Plato's Republic, this idea
of the breakdown of forms of government plays a central role in his attempt to construct
the ideal state. Subsequent republican thought offers the theory of the mixed state as a
response to the problem of cyclical degeneration of the state. It's champion was the
Roman historian, Polybius, who wrote toward the end of the republican era in Rome.
While the mixed constitution was supposed to preserve society, rather than liberty - i.e.,
Polybius probably did not think of the mixed state, as we do today, as a form of counter-
balancing powers - it was a short step from the old republican to the newer liberal idea
that counter-balanced power decentralizes power. See FINK, supra note 60 at 1-10, for a
discussion of the idea of the mixed constitution in Roman republican thinking. The
development of our own conceptions of counter-balanced power runs from this ancient
idea through Harrington to more recent thinkers.
84. This issue has divided negative liberals. Isaiah Berlin, the modern defender of a
negative conception of liberty argues, nevertheless, that earlier negative liberals were
wrong in believing that mere absence of constraint was sufficient for liberty. In addition,
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Third, diversity serves to de-centralize power with a distinct end
in mind: to serve the human need to live actively and expressively.
De-centralized government permits more persons to take part in
ordering their world, as civic republicans remind us. Civic
republicans and others hold that this expression of the vita activa
itself results in a subtle transformation of the human personality;
where people take part in government, they feel a sense of
responsibility for the affairs of state and for others generally." They
have more than merely a personal stake in society. Indeed, human
beings develop a sense of connectedness primarily by having and
taking responsibility for others, and by having a share in the
communal or collective aspects of our existence. In this respect,
communitarian liberals such as de Tocqueville and modern civic
republicans are correct to see a deep connection between social and
political participation in self-government and the development of a
network of connectedness among persons.86 It should be added,
however, that this realization of the vita activa can take place in
different contexts, and is not expressly limited to the political domain
in the narrow sense.
Finally, diversity has been linked to the pursuit of progress, truth,
happiness and liberty because of its capacity to generate social
comparisons. John Stuart Mill used the metaphor of natural selection
to describe the function of social diversity. He argued that diversity
permits us to compare different religions, lifestyles, social responses,
etc. to determine which are better, more true or more efficient in
achieving particular social and individual goals.87 This conception of
diversity underlies the "marketplace of ideas" rationale for freedom
of speech 'advanced by Oliver Wendell Holmes' and Brandeis' idea
Berlin argues, there must be a reasonable range of alternative options that make choice
meaningful. Berlin, supra note 2, at 130. Compare HAYEK, supra note 2, at 13 (whether a
person is free or not "does not depend upon the range of choice").
85. See BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY (1988) (for the modern
elaboration of this ancient republican theme); see also ARENDT, supra note 56, at 7-21
(describing the vita activa).
86. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1; MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE
LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1998).
87. MILL, supra note 11, at 53-72. Interestingly, Mill published On Liberty the same
year that Darwin's Origin of the Species appeared, in 1859. The notion that society should
operate in a manner similar to the evolutionary idea of chance variation and natural
selection was apparently in the air at the time. In Mill's thought, diversity secured that
chance variation required in the state of nature. Human goals - survival, progress, wealth,
happiness, etc. - "selected" the more successful of the diverse experiments in life.
88. Id. at 15-52. This influenced Holmes' defense of freedom of speech, which in turn
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that the states should act as social laboratories, experimenting with
different policy responses to common problems.89
In all of these different respects, diversity preserves the political,
social and personal liberty of the individual. Nevertheless, this raises
a question about the role of government vis a vis social diversity. If
diversity is important to liberty then should the government have a
role in engineering and preserving diversity? The third aspect of the
homeostatic model of liberty concerns this relationship between
government and civil society. Most basically, government has the role
and function of maintaining the political and social balance of power
between the competing diversity of interests. We will see that, in
many cases, this requires the maintenance of a position of strict
neutrality among the diverse and often competing sub-cultures,
interest groups, religions, political parties, etc. Indeed, this principled
neutrality represents one of the pillars of twentieth century liberal
thought.9°
Yet, as this article argues later, strict neutrality may not be
appropriate to preserve liberty under certain social conditions.
Neutrality may not be optimal to the preservation of liberty, for
example, where one interest group threatens to accumulate sufficient
social or political power to destroy the conditions necessary for
diversity itself. In limited cases, the function of government must be
to move beyond strict neutrality in the interest of restoring the
balance necessary to liberty. This third element of the homeostatic
ideal is the one that is most troubling to classical liberals and their
fellow travelers. Of course, this third aspect raises a number of
difficult issues. Most importantly, what constitutes an appropriate
balance and when is it appropriate to intervene? Moreover, since the
diminution in diversity may sometimes reflect the natural
development of the conditions of civil society or changing patterns in
individual preferences, in some contexts, government efforts to
preserve diversity may be counter-productive, or even destructive of
liberty. Determining when the preservation of diversity is necessary
to a particular aspect of society and when it is not will be essential to
maintaining social balance. These are issues that will be considered in
led to greater protection for the right of free speech in constitutional history. For a
modern defense, see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
89. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 309-11 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
90. ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989); Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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Part Three.
A. The Madisonian Conception of Liberty
The foundation of Madison's conception of liberty, and his
theory for its preservation, is presented in the Federalist Papers, most
particularly, those two documents that have attracted the greatest
share of attention on the part of scholars, lawyers and citizens,
Federalist numbers 10 and 51.1 In Federalist 51, he makes clear that
his theory is to cover not simply government itself, but the private
domain as well, at least to the extent that private interests affect
government:
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the
defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole
system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it
particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of
power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the
several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on
the other - that the private interest of every individual may be a
sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence
cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme
powers of the State. 2
In the Madisonian conception of liberty, democracy, checks and
balances and rights all serve the function of diluting the possible
concentration of power for unjust purposes that are destructive to
liberty.
Madison's conception of democracy is distinct from that of the
pure positive value of participatory democracy central to certain
strands of republicanism. Where republican ideals after early Greek
conceptions view democracy as a means to achieving a human telos,
the full flowering of man's nature as a political animal,93 the
Madisonian conception of democracy has two different functions.
First, popular government is necessary as an expression of popular
sovereignty but, secondly, it distributes power across groups and
among the citizenry in a manner that serves to check the influence of
minority factions. Thus, "[i]n the extended republic of the United
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 22, at 356.
92. Id.
93. Republican thought followed and presaged the Aristotelian idea that politics was
a means to achieving the human telos, or our innate human purpose or potential.
ARISTOTLE, Politics, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (Richard McKeown ed.,
1941). See also ARENDT, supra note 56 (discussing the vita activa); Quentin Skinner, The
Paradoxes of Political Liberty, LIBERTY 190-94 (David Miller ed., 1991) (discussing the
republican conception of human excellence and its relation to liberty).
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States, and among the great variety of interests, parties and sects
which it embraces, a coalition of the majority of the whole society
could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice
and the general good."94 This same idea is central to Federalist 10,
which examines the problem of faction at some length. Madison's
conception of faction is normative and functional. A faction is
defined as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or
minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community."95 Where a faction represents a minority of the general
population, democracy provides the necessary protection against its
influence. It ensures that the government has as its end the
protection of individual rights and the preservation of the general
interest of society. It is this guarantee of private right and public
interest that characterizes, in general terms, the social balance that is
necessary to liberty in Madison's conception.
When, on the other hand, a faction represents a majority of the
populace, democracy itself, at least in its pure popular form, provides
little remedy to the factious destruction of liberty. In Federalist 51,
Madison observes that there are two responses to this problem. The
first is the response of one brand of republicanism; its implications are
distinctly anti-liberal: this is accomplished "by creating a will in the
community independent of the majority - that is, of the society
itself."'96 Madison has in mind here Rousseau's idea of the General
Will, a will that is somehow distinct from a combination of the wills of
every individual.97 According to Rousseau,
There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all
and the General Will; the latter considers only the common
interest, while the former takes private interest into account,
and is no more than a sum of particular wills, but take away
from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel one
another, and the General Will remains as the sum of
differences.98
In other words, the public interest is somehow distinct from all
private interests combined; it is a kind of transcendent public good.
American republicanism never took this potentially totalitarian ideal
94. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 22, at 359.
95. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 22, at 130 (emphasis added).
96. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 22, at 358.
97. ROUSSEAU, supra note 64, at 120-21.
98. Id.
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seriously. Thomas Jefferson, who in some respects was even more
sympathetic to classical republican values than Madison, dismissed
this idea of the transcendent will and the overarching social interest
by arguing that "the rights of the whole can be no more than the sum
of the rights of individuals. '"
Thus, for Madison, while democracy could function defectively,
from the standpoint of the preservation of individual rights and the
aggregate good, the solution was not to abstract a general will distinct
from the interests of all individuals in the community. He believed
that this is "at best, but a precarious security" and, that it is genuinely
destructive of liberty.'" It requires making all interests uniform and
equal, thereby undermining "the protection of these faculties [the
diverse faculties of men] that is the first object of government."'' The
second and preferred method for preventing the tyranny of the
majority, Madison argues is that, "[w]hilst all authority in
[government] will be derived from and dependent on the society, the
society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes
of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in
little danger of interested combinations of the majority."' 2 In other
words, the problem of factions will counteract itself as diverse
interests will be able to combine only on policies that are generally
just and share not just popular support, but something approaching a
functional consensus.
But why, we might ask, should this be so? If a majority within a
small republic can assert itself in contravention of the rights of others
and to the detriment of the public interest, then why should a
majority from a larger combination of factions be any less likely to do
the same? Why should we assume, for example, that these diverse
interests will cancel one another out with respect to their selfish aims,
rather than with regard to their more noble purposes? Why is a
combination of three more likely to oppress one than a group of one
hundred to trod on the rights of forty? Similarly, what prevents a
mediocre consensus from taking place-one that is neither
particularly good nor evil, but a kind of "lowest common
denominator" of interest? And how does a diversity of interest
guarantee a better result than where relatively homogeneous interests
99. MAYER, supra note 73, at 76 (quoting Jefferson in a letter to the economist, Jean
Baptiste).
100. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 22, at 358.
101. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 22, at 131.
102. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 22, at 358.
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prevail?
The answer, it shall be suggested here, may lie in the
mathematical idea that we will call the "principle of aggregated
moderation:"'' 3 As human responses (preferences, choices, activities)
are aggregated in larger numbers, the average results tend to conform
increasingly to a statistical norm that approximates either a median
point among all responses or a general human norm. A rough
analogy can be found in repeating a coin toss several times. The
greater the number of tosses, the greater the probability that the
aggregated results approximates the abstract average - that heads and
tails should land fifty percent of the time each. We know that
Madison was greatly influenced at a young age by the Aristotelian
philosophy of his Princeton teacher, James Witherspoon, with its
emphasis upon the Golden Mean as an indication of the rightness of
an act.' °4  Madison later read Hume's Idea of a Perfect
Commonwealth, which provided the modern rebuttal to Aristotle's
defense of small republics and argued that large republics could
withstand factionalism better than small republics precisely because
of their capacity to counter-balance interests.'5 Madison overlaid his
Aristotelianism with his Humean sensibilities. A larger republic, with
a diversity of interests, was the better means for achieving the
political Golden Mean that represented a proper balance of interests.
For Madison, democracy was not a political device for aggregating
preferences, as it would be for later utilitarians, but for selecting the
appropriate ends of government through a process that facilitates
aggregated moderation.
This same principle of supplying "by opposite and rival interests,
the defect of better motives," is at work in the system of government
itself. The various checks and balances between Congress and the
103. Charles Saunders Pierce is supposed to have picked the term "pragmaticism,"
saying that it was ugly enough to be memorable. In a similar vein, the "principle of
aggregated moderation" is, the author believes, pompous enough that it will stick. At any
rate the principle is the political equivalent of the scientific idea that natural occurrences
adhere to a statistical norm over an increasingly large number of such events. Democracy
serves the same function by aggregating responses over a large and representative portion
of the population.
104. See RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 42-43 (1998) (discussing
the influence of Aristotle and Hume on Madison's thought).
105. David Hume, The Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, POLITICAL WRITINGS. See
Douglas Adair, That Politics May Be Reduced to a Perfect Science: David Hume, James
Madison and the Tenth Federalist, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: ESSAYS BY
DOUGLAS ADAIR (Trevor Colburn ed., 1974) (arguing that Madison was more greatly
influenced by Hume than had previously been recognized).
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President, between both political branches and the courts, and
between the two Houses of Congress itself serve to ensure both that
rival interests are counterbalanced so that "the interest of the man
may be connected with the constitutional rights of the place."
Moreover, federalism entails a counter-balancing of power between
state and federal governments so that "a double security arises in the
rights of the people. The different governments will control each
other at the same time that each will be controlled by itself."'" In
more abstract form, Madison may have conceived that this principle
of moderation is achieved through checks and balances and through
federalism by aggregating the inputs by officers of the various
branches of government and state and federal representatives.
While Federalist 10 and 51 apply this same conception of liberty,
respectively, to the role of interest groups outside of government as
they affect government, and to government itself, Madison
understood that this idea was important outside of government in
limited areas of the social sphere as well. While such reasoning was
not yet used in the context of economic relations, precisely because
economic power did not pose the problem it would represent a
century later, religious sects at the time often did possess great social
power. This was particularly the case where a given sect held a
monopoly of political power due to establishment of religion by state
authorities. Madison's ideas concerning the relationship between
religious diversity and the concentration of social power are of great
relevance here because of their implications for economic and other
forms of concentrated power in our own time. Madison's Memorial
and Remonstrance," 7 written in opposition to a proposed Virginia
bill which would have taxed residents of the state to support the
state's established religion, and other writings on religion, apply the
same reasoning that underlies the philosophy of checks and balances
to the plurality of sects.
In comments made to the Virginia ratifying convention in 1788,
Madison makes the first of the three arguments for diversity with
respect to religion. Religious freedom is protected by having a
diversity of religious sects, thereby preventing majority domination of
religion:
This freedom [of religious expression] arises from that
multiplicity of sects, which pervades America, and which is the
106. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 22, at 357.
107. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, THE
COMPLETE MADISON 299-306 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953).
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best and only security for religious liberty in any society. For
when there is such a variety of sects, there cannot be a majority
of any one sect to oppress and persecute the rest. . . .The
United States abound in such a variety of sects, that it is a
strong security against religious persecution, and it is sufficient
to authorize a conclusion that no one sect will ever be able to
outnumber or depress the rest"o8
A plurality of sects has the same ultimate effect in matters of religious
liberty that the extended republic's embrace of a multiplicity of
factions has for political liberty; each prevents tyranny by foreclosing
the concentration of social power.
Second, and perhaps even more directly, religious diversity is
obviously necessary to reflect the divergent convictions of all persons.
The right to the free exercise of religion is inalienable "because the
opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by
their own minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men.'.
Diversity in the religious context is necessary not to create a greater
number of options for its own sake-in contrast to a distinctly
modern rationale which vouchsafes diversity on grounds that the
quality of any choice is partially a function of the number of available
options-but to protect the dignity of religious commitments that
have already been made by those with various beliefs. State support
of one sect "degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose
opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative
authority.." Diversity thus preserves liberty and equality of
citizenship by according equal dignity to all beliefs.
Further, eighty years before Mill's defense of freedom of thought
and expression on the grounds that a diversity of ideas would foster
the pursuit of truth,"' Madison made the same argument in the
context of religious expression, arguing that state support of one sect
is "adverse to the diffusion of the light of Christianity.""' He insisted
that tolerance for a diversity of religions was conducive to the pursuit
of religious truth: "Instead of leveling, as far as possible, every
obstacle to the victorious progress of truth, the Bill [to support one
sect by tax], with an ignoble and unchristian timidity, would
circumscribe it, with a wall of defense against the encroachments of
108. Id. at 306; see also James Madison, Comments made in Virginia Convention, June
12, 1788, in id.
109. Madison, supra note 107, at 300.
110. Id. at 303.
Ill. MILL, supra note 11.
112. Madison, supra note 107.
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error.".. 3 In sum, diversity engenders competition and comparison in
the name of religious truth. The clash of religious doctrines would
serve to dialectically arrive at the truth in the same manner by which
the aggregated responses of those with diverse interests would serve
to select the appropriate political ends of society.
Finally, Madison does not link religious diversity anywhere to the
fourth species of argument; the civic republican idea that diversity
requires decentralized power which, in turn, promotes individual
participation. This is due to the fact that Madison was not as
concerned with the participatory values of decentralized power as
were Jefferson and others of more extreme republican sympathies. In
this respect, as we have observed already, Madison's republicanism
was thoroughly modern, and dramatically de-emphasized positive
liberty in its pure participatory form. Nevertheless, in the framework
of government that Madison took a leading role in creating, these
values are realized. Diversity engenders the republican values of
participation, expression and political and social engagement by
decentralizing power centers within society through the fostering of a
plurality of interest groups, secondary associations and subcultures.
Certainly this understanding was the central motivating force behind
American federalism and underlies the commitment, in liberal
communitarian thought from de Tocqueville to the present, to the
value of widely distributed localized power. This is true not only in
the political context, but in social contexts as well. Wherever
centralized power predominates within certain social contexts,
bureaucracy and individual alienation are not far to follow, though
they take different forms in distinct social settings. The modern
republican recognition that a decentralized ownership of small
business conduces to the values of civic and economic responsibility
among participants in the economy,"' the recent communitarian
argument that self-policing gives community members a sense of
commitment through a share of responsibility for their
neighborhoods, "'5 and the contemporary notion that workers who are
made shareholders in their employer-company make a more personal
commitment to their jobs. 6 are all ideas cut from the same civic
113. Id. at 304.
114. SANDEL, supra note 6, at ch. 7 (discussing the republican ideal of small business
ownership as a means of economic and political independence).
115. John J. Dilulio, Jr., Inner City Crime: What the Federal Government Should Do,
THE ESSENTIAL COMMUNITARIAN READER (1998).
116. BARBER, supra note 85.
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republican cloth. In each case, diversity and decentralization serve
the purpose of promoting positive liberty in its only possible modern
visage.
In the end, however, diversity was not simply a means to
preserving liberty, in Madison's thought, it was partially constitutive
of liberty. Indeed, what is most frequently overlooked and yet so
uniquely modern in Madison's thought is his commitment to
individualism, conceived as diversity of personal character, talents
and inclinations. For Madison, it was not the protection of property
that was the chief end of government, as it was for Locke, but "the
diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property
originate ... [that] is the first object of government.'. 17 Individuality
conduces to diversity and diversity to individuality: "From the
protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property,
the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately
results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views
of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into
different interests and parties."'' 8  Long before J. S. Mill, Isaiah
Berlin and the distinguished line of later liberal thinkers began to
emphasize the relationship between individuality, social diversity and
personal liberty, it was central to James Madison's theory of liberty.
B. The Function of Rights in the Constitutional Thought of the Framers
Madison's view of rights, and that of many of his contemporaries,
also transcended the liberal/republican dichotomization popular
among some scholars today. Rights were neither merely the absolute
libertarian checks upon government as conceived by later liberals, nor
the simple means to a form of republican participatory government.
They were partially both, and they were simultaneously more than
this. From the beginning of American constitutional history, there
has developed a third and distinctly American theory of the function
of rights: In many contexts, rights serve not merely as checks upon
government in the sense that they function as negative limits,
cordoning off certain spheres of activity from government
interference, but as affirmative devices for encouraging the
development of countervailing spheres of power. As such, they
redistribute political and social power in a manner that engenders
reactive forces against government power by fostering oppositional
117. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 22, at 130-31. Compare LOCKE, supra note
33 ("The great and chief end" of government is "the preservation of... property.").
118. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 22, at 130.
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interests outside of it. In sum, rights should be conceived in the same
Madisonian terms that characterize the checks and balances within
government. This section briefly discusses three such rights - the right
to freedom of the press, the right to property and the right to trial by
jury.
Negative liberals typically view the function of rights in one or
both of two related ways. First, rights serve as substantive guarantees
against government encroachment so that certain forms of human
activity will be protected for its own sake. We protect certain rights
simply because doing so is intrinsic to human flourishing, or necessary
to the recognition of human dignity or self-determination.' 9 In sum,
one function of human rights is to preserve the individual's liberty to
engage in the activities protected by the right. The second function of
rights, in contrast, is primarily procedural or instrumental. Rights
function in this fashion not to protect a certain activity, but to disable
government from acting in ways that are generally destructive of
liberty, even if the activity itself is not protected for its own inherent
value. For example, Jefferson had developed a sophisticated theory
of rights in which he maintained that there were in fact two kinds of
rights, the inalienable "natural rights" of the individual, which are to
be protected by government in virtue of their inherent value, and
what he called "fences against wrong" - rights that serve to preserve
free government.2 Jefferson held that the former were natural rights
in the full sense that they could be said to exist independently of
institutional recognition; he conceived of these as derivative of the
"higher law" that should guide positive law. The latter, instrumental
safeguards were human constructions the purpose of which was to
preserve liberty generally. Revealingly, Jefferson counted the free
exercise of religion among the first, natural species of right, while
viewing freedom of the press as an instance of the second,
instrumental variety.' 2
In contrast to the modern liberal construction of the right to a
free press, which conceives it primarily as a protection for the
119. ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON JUSTIFICATION AND
APPLICATION (1982); H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175
(1955); Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1982); J. DONNELLY,
THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1985); JEREMY WALDRON, THEORIES OF RIGHTS
(1984); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
120. MAYER, supra note 73, at 157.
121. Id. (citing Letter to Noah Webster, Dec. 4,1790).
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individual's right to express herself openly and without repression 1
2-
a private right of the speaker to speak-the "structural" function of
the free speech right described here views individual expression as an
affirmative act that has political consequences. And in
contradistinction to the republican ideal, which views the right to a
free press as a means to facilitating an informed and vigilant
citizenry1 23 - a right of the citizen to hear and to exchange views - this
third conception connects protection of the rights of speech and press
with the capacity of diverse groups to generate countervailing
messages that confront "official" or public accounts with a contrary
point of view. The more fundamental purpose of this freedom is to
offset government power with respect to the channels of influence in
which political power is secured and by which government power
exerts formative and regulative control over the lives of individuals.
In 1975, Justice Stewart argued that the Framers gave the press
this special protection over and above that which is accorded speech,
and that the press clause should be viewed as akin to a structural
provision of the Constitution.2 5  (The First Amendment does
distinguish speech and press, indicating that they are distinct rights). 6
As Stewart argued:
The Free Press clause extends protection to an institution....
[In] setting up the three branches of the Federal Government,
the Framers deliberately created an internally competitive
system. [The] primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee
of a free press was to create a fourth institution outside the
government as an additional check on the three official
122. See David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral
Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974) (free speech serves an
"autonomy" function, i.e., to permit open expression of the individual). For a classic
example of this in operation, see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (jacket bearing
the words, "Fuck the Draft" protected speech even though the same opinion could be
expressed in more neutral terms).
123. This conception of free speech was developed during the twentieth century in
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948).
124. This is not simply a "truth-finding" function of speech, though the conception
defended here certainly contributes to the pursuit of truth through clashing viewpoints. In
addition, however, the existence of alternative channels of information encourages active
development of diverse and often countervailing opinions as a prod to individual
development and to facilitate more active participation in the development of ideas and
opinions.
125. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
126. The First Amendment prohibits any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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branches.'27
Expression serves a wholly distinct purpose by offsetting
government power. In its capacity to investigate, to disclose and to
editorialize, the press serves this essential liberty-preserving function.
This counteractive function is not limited to public power and the
First Amendment's protection of the right of freedom of the press has
been extended over the entire domain of social and economic affairs
precisely because we recognize that the exercise of power and
influence are not limited to the public realm.
This distrust of power, and the perceived need to offset it, was
also important to the Framers' conception of property rights.
2 8
Property rights were usually conceived as both the necessary means
to, and the ultimate ends of, government. They both preserved
liberty and were liberty. For classical liberals, government exists
primarily to preserve property.
As John Locke emphatically concluded, "[t]he great and chief
end... of men's uniting into common-wealths, and putting
themselves under government, is the preservation of their property."2 9
Nevertheless, the English republicans writing a generation before
Locke would have reversed the order of priority. For James
Harrington, whose thought greatly influenced Jefferson and others
among the Framers, the right to property was not primarily the object
of free government, but rather, a necessary condition for free
government.3 Where free government preserves property on liberal
accounts, property preserves free government on republican theories.
(Indeed, ironically, in this respect English republican thought is closer
in spirit to contemporary libertarian thinking than it is to that of
127. Stewart, supra note 125, at 633-34.
128. The Framers were greatly influenced by Harrington's admonition that liberty
required a wide dispersal of property. HARRINGTON, supra note 83. Even conservatives
like John Adams recognized the importance of property rights in this respect. Property
gave the individual independence from others and, for this reason, property was in
Algernon Sydney's words, "an appendage of liberty." JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE
CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 72 (1988). It also
existed as a more general economic buffer against political power so that, the more
property that existed outside of the hands of government, the more government could be
resisted.
129. LOCKE, supra note 33, 124 (emphasis added). Recall that, for Locke, as for
Madison a century later, the term "property" included not simply one's material
possessions, but all of one's rights. Thus, while today we might say that we have a liberty
interest in our property, Locke would have said that we have a property interest in our
liberty.
130. HARRINGTON, supra note 83; see also FINK, supra note 60, at ch. III (discussing
Harrington's theory of government).
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either the modern progressive liberal or to the contemporary
republican). 3'
The republican theory of property rights is intimately connected
to the problem of the concentration of power. As Harrington
claimed, "power follows property." '132 The republican conviction that
a wide distribution of property is the surest defense against a
concentration of power was shared, with varying degrees of
enthusiasm, by Madison, Jefferson and others of the revolutionary
generation, though all but the most radical were opposed to leveling
schemes or modern forms of redistribution.133 This idea played a role
in the initial reservation of the franchise, in most states, to property
owners.' The fear that those without property would be coopted by
their economic superiors, that the poor would sell their votes to the
wealthy, played as much a role in reserving the right to vote to
freeholders as did the fear that "an excess of democracy" would result
in the dilution of the rights of the propertied."5
The Whiggish ideal of property as a counter-balance to
government power was closer to Antifederalist and republican, than
to Federalist sensibilities. In this respect, as in many others, the
Federalists truly were the proto-liberals, favoring property as the
purpose for, rather than the means to, free government. While the
liberal conception of property has prevailed ideologically in the
political imagination of modern America, the tension between the
republican and liberal ideas was centrally important to the debates
among the founding brothers of the new government. This tension
131. See HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 13, at 115 ("What our
generation has forgotten is that the system of private property is the most important
guarantee of freedom, not only for those who own property, but scarcely less for those
who do not.").
132. HARRINGTON, supra note 83, at 11-12.
133. MAYER, supra note 73, at 76-80 (discussing Jefferson's distinction between
natural rights and "adventitious" rights, or utilitarian rights which society invests in
individuals to promote progress, and his view that property rights fall into the former
category); Letter from James Madison to National Gazette (Mar. 29, 1792) (in THE
COMPLETE MADISON 268) (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) ("A just security to property is not
afforded to that species of government under which unequal taxes oppress one species of
property, and reward another."). In Federalist 10 Madison similarly warns of the "rage for
paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other
improper or wicked project." THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 22, at 136.
134. NOTES TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, at 401-06.
135. Blackstone argued that an indigent person could not be trusted with the vote.
This argument was accepted by Adams, Hamilton and certain other of the Federalists, but
was rejected by Madison and Jefferson. MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 261-65 (1978).
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surfaced in grand fashion in the controversy concerning proposed
Federalist policies, spear-headed by Alexander Hamilton, to fund the
federal debt by the sale of securities to investors36 Underlying
Hamilton's economic arguments concerning the need to establish a
monetary supply was the still deeper motivation that fostering
investments in the new nation would, as Michael Sandel observes,
"build support for the new national government by giving a wealthy
and influential class of investors a financial stake in it. 137 This was,
however, exactly what others, particularly republicans with
Harringtonian apprehensions, feared. The prospect that there would
be a concentration of power and a cross-pollination of influence
among the wealthy and the politically powerful spurred the worst
fears by those who believed that the control and influence that come
with property should remain outside of government. In sum, while
the Federalist vision sought to use property to protect government
and government to protect property, the Whiggish conception of
property as a counter-check on government was jettisoned in
Federalist fiscal policy. Subsequent conceptions of property have
followed the road of Locke, rather than Harrington, but the influence
of property as a counterweight to government remains a legacy in our
tradition that might some day be revivified.
Finally, there remains the issue concerning the significance of the
right to trial by jury in early American legal thought. In contrast to
contemporary liberal ideals that view the right to a trial by a jury of
one's peers as a procedural safeguard protecting the criminal
defendant, the republican ideal viewed it as an opportunity for
citizens to participate in government. As de Tocqueville noted after
his travels in America during the 1830s:
The jury is... above all a political institution.... To use a jury
to suppress crimes is to introduce an eminently republican
element into the government.... The jury may be an
aristocratic or a democratic institution, according to the class
from which the jurors are selected, but there is always a
republican character in it, inasmuch as it puts the real control of
affairs into the hands of the ruled, or some of them, rather than
into the hands of the rulers.... For that reason the man who is
judge in criminal trial is the real master of society.
3
Trial by jury was one of six rights for which Jefferson sought
136. See JOHN STEELE GORDON, HAMILTON'S BLESSING (1997) (a description and
defense of Hamilton's policies).
137. SANDEL, supra note 6, at 134.
138. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 272.
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inclusion in the Bill of Rights. He valued jury service for its
propensity to involve normal citizens in the day-to-day operations of
government.' 9 John Adams, who adhered strenuously to the older
republican philosophy of mixed government, believed that juries
"introduced into the executive branch of the constitution.., a
mixture of popular power."'' ° Indeed, in our nation's early history,
juries did considerably more than act as fact-finders, as they do today;
they played a role in making substantive law in a range of areas.'
This function began to change by the early nineteenth century with
the increased specialization and instrumentalism of the law.'42
Nevertheless, even during the revolutionary period, the citizen's
participation on the jury was not intended simply to give otherwise
private citizens the experience of taking part in government, either
for its intrinsic value or for its vaunted effect of sharpening the public
judgment of the individual. Though these were certainly important
consequences of the jury system, underlying both was the notion that
the right to participate on the jury had a power-dispersing effect; the
power of judgment was taken out of the hands of public officials and
given to citizens. As Bernard Bailyn has observed, the jury was
intended not simply to create a balance or to give popular voice, but
to exert pressure "against the executive from outside, by an
independent judiciary."'43
Is this conception of the jury liberal or republican in nature? The
answer, put simply, is that it is both, and yet something more.
Offsetting the power of the magistrate with the power of the public
undeniably functions to limit government power, as negative liberals
deem essential. At the same time, however, participation on the jury
affords private citizens an occasional opportunity to take part in the
experiment of self-government. Transcending this liberal/republican
dichotomy of conceptions of freedom, however, is a more holistic
ideal of liberty. The enterprise of limiting government and the
imperative to decentralize power are both part and parcel of a deeper
ideal of freedom, an idea that holds that the franchise on power must
be distributed widely among those over whom that power is to be
exercised, and that the counter-balancing of power with power is
139. MAYER, supra note 73, at 262.
140. BAILYN, supra note 58, at 74.
141. KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 107-09
(1989).
142. Id. at 172-74.
143. BAILYN, supra note 58, at 74.
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essential to the preservation of liberty.
C. Subsequent Development of the Homeostatic Conception of Liberty
This section of the Article will briefly sketch the evolution of the
homeostatic conception of liberty in nineteenth and twentieth century
legal history and social thought. This will be a general discussion, and
will elaborate the overall trend of modern liberal thought from the
decline of the classical liberal model to the present. In Part III, we
take up a more detailed consideration of the homeostatic model from
the standpoint of recent constitutional developments.
Central to the homeostatic conception of liberty is the idea that
freedom requires a kind of social balance between diverse, often
competing, social interests. Madison could only conceive of this
balance as equivalent to the furtherance of "justice and the general
good," a state of affairs in which the "rights of other citizens" and
"the permanent and aggregate interests of the community" each have
their due.1" These criteria, of course, are extraordinarily vague,
particularly since it was not clear what balance should prevail
between public and private interests. Nevertheless, subsequent
developments in the liberal tradition and in the American legal order
have served to provide a somewhat more determinate conception of
social balance. With the rejection of the idea that there exists an
overall social good that transcends the interests of the individuals who
make up a community or a society,"' the idea of social balance could
not be conceived globally, in general terms, as a product of some
overall social measure. Instead, it could only be defined in particular
contexts and, more specifically, from the standpoint of the individual
with respect to a certain social relation. Equality of power came to be
recognized as a necessary ingredient of individual liberty. The
emerging litmus test for whether a rough social balance exists in a
given social context could be gauged by the individual's capacity for
self-determination-for genuine freedom of choice-in that social
context.'4 6  While even the concept of self-determination is shot
through with normative implications and requires that certain kinds
144. THE FEDERALIST 10, supra note 22, at 130.
145. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (discussing the ontological
collectivism that characterizes some forms of republican thought).
146. In England, the progressive reaction to earlier forms of liberalism can be traced to
the 1870s and 1880s. One of the first among this line was T.H. Green, a liberal reformer
who embraced the more "organic" conception of the state. Green, supra note 23. These
ideas were adopted by the progressives that came to be known as the legal realists in
America. See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J.470 (1909).
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of social judgments be made,"7 it provides a more determinate focus
for a theory of freedom than did its less specific precursors.
By the time of the progressive reaction to the negative liberalism
of the nineteenth century, beginning about the 1880s in England and
around the turn of the century in America,' 8 this distinct ideal of
liberty as self-determination began to emerge. It accepted the
essentially negative liberal premise that liberty is to be equated with
free choice in a range of matters, including personal relationships,
employment and economic relations and religious choice, among
others, but differed from the earlier liberalism with respect to the idea
that non-regulation was the best way to achieve this freedom of
choice. True liberty required, very simply, the partial equalization of
power where changing economic relations had deprived workers and
consumers of the freedom of choice characteristic of the face-to-face
bargaining typical of pre-industrial contexts. This dearth of social
freedom was often put in the old liberal language of "coercion" and
"compulsion," but these ideas came to mean considerably more than
non-interference by the state. As a progressive labor activist of the
time put it: "What I agree to do in order to escape from starvation, or
to save my wife and children from starvation, or through ignorance of
my ability to do anything else, I agree to do under compulsion, just as
much as if I agreed to do it with a pistol at my head.'
149
Central to the progressive instinct was the conviction that, in
economic matters, the relationship between the individual and the
corporation had changed dramatically, such that conditions of
Madisonian pluralism no longer prevailed, if they ever had. Yet the
reason for this could be cast in Madisonian terms: The problem was
that the economic interests among those owning productive property
were not sufficiently diverse to offset each other, particularly with
respect to the employer-employee relationship. Given this
conception of liberty, government intervention in a plethora of social
147. Recall that, on many negative liberal accounts, liberty is an empirical value: it is a
measure of non-constraint in a host of social contexts. This positivistic conception of
liberty flows from Hobbes to modern day positivists. See IAN CARTER, A MEASURE OF
FREEDOM (1999) (for the most rigorous recent attempt to construct a value free theory of
freedom). See FELIX OPPENHEIM, DIMENSIONS OF FREEDOM (1961) (for the classic
positivist statement on liberty).
148. See HOBHOUSE, supra note 36, at 63-73 (discussing the progressive reaction to the
classical model); Green, supra note 23 (for an early example of this in England).
149. SANDEL, supra note 6, at 189-90. Sandel has argued that this reconceptualization
of earlier liberal ideas should be understood as a progressive brand of voluntarism which
emphasizes autonomous individual choice in conditions of rough economic equality. Id. at
188.
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and economic spheres could be justified as liberty-enhancing. In
some cases, such as that of collective bargaining, the state could
justify its effort to equalize conditions on the grounds that, with such
limitations on traditional principles of freedom of contract, state
intervention would assist workers in protecting their own autonomy.
In other cases, including maximum hour and minimum wage laws, the
law itself would serve to impose substantive limits on contract to
offset conditions of inequality in the bargaining process.' By the
time of the Lochner era, hundreds of state and federal laws had been
passed in the effort to reallocate power, usually in the context of the
labor relationship."' The Lochner era itself represents the period of
high tension in constitutional history, when judges who embraced the
old classical conception of freedom increasingly faced laws passed in
the spirit of a distinct conception of liberty.
One important consequence of the progressive ideal of liberty
was that rights did not need to be conceived as pre-political checks on
the democratic process. Rights could be generated by affirmative
legislation itself. In this manner, democracy did not have to be
conceived as existing in tension with rights, but could be a means to
advance the cause of rights. This, however, had a second
consequence: It tended to break down the old positivist distinction
between (pre-political) rights and (post-political) privileges.'52
Bentham's adamant conviction that "every law is an infraction of
liberty" was replaced with the idea that positive law might be used to
maximize liberty by strategically altering power relations within the
domain of civil society."' This, in turn, had a deeper impact upon our
conception of constitutional government generally. Acceptance of
the progressive conception of liberty meant that courts could no
longer be viewed as the sole guardians of liberty. Indeed, the
protection and furtherance of liberty became an increasingly
legislative function. In the deepest sense, this undermined, to a much
greater extent than is often recognized, the idea that the constitution
is primarily concerned with structuring and protecting liberty, i.e.,
150. Green, supra note 23; Kronman, supra note 44.
151. About three hundred such laws had been struck down by state and federal courts
by the year 1920. WILLIAM E. FORHATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN
LABOR MOVEMENT 38, 177-92 (1991).
152. Alstyne, supra note 41.
153. Ronald Dworkin gives the example of the use of traffic regulations. While these
interfere with the negative liberty of drivers by requiring them to stop at the light, it
maximizes overall liberty by creating an orderly flow of traffic and by preventing
accidents. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 299 (1977).t
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that the courts preserve liberty against the encroachments of the
legislature.
The heightened role of the legislature in structuring social liberty
has important consequences for the classical liberal reliance on the
public/private distinction as well. If liberty as self-determination can
be hindered by the exercise of power, and if power exists in the
private as well as the public realms, then the old idea that rights
should apply only against the government loses its significance. An
important aspect of the legal-realist critique of libertarian conceptions
of freedom involved a broadside attack upon the public-private
dichotomy."' Realists argued that public power creates and
structures private power and that private relations were largely a
function of legal rules, rights and entitlements. Accordingly, the state
could change and restructure these same private relations in a way to
enhance individual self-determination in social and economic, as well
as purely political, contexts.
Progressives were primarily concerned with social balance along
what we might describe as a vertical social axis - i.e., they sought to
equalize power between the individual and institutions, corporations
and other larger social groups. There was little in the early
progressive agenda, as such, however, that concerned balance along a
horizontal social axis - i.e., balance among these large institutions and
groups. Progressives rarely considered the idea that diversity and
social balance were more than individual goals, that a diversity and
balance among groups was necessary to individual liberty. Nor were
most progressives concerned with the participatory and expressive
implications of diversity.' Nevertheless, in one context, at least,
progressives concerned themselves with the problem of the
concentration of power-in this case, economic power-and its
implications for diversity. Antitrust legislation was based
appropriately on an application, within the domain of economic
power, of ideas similar to those Madison deployed in the political
context a century earlier. The concentration of economic power in
154. By the 1920s, the legal realist movement was involved in the intellectual assault
on the assumptions underlying the older form of liberalism. Thinkers such as Robert
Hale, Morris Cohen and Jerome Frank assailed notions of negative rights and the
public/private dichotomy. See Hale, supra note 42, at 108.; Cohen, supra note 38; ADOLF
A. BEARLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
155. SANDEL, supra note 6, at 197-200. Brandeis was an exception. See id. at 211-17
(discussing the "de-centralized" version of progressivism and its commitment to a
republican ideal).
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one corporation dominating a particular area of the market posed the
same threat to liberty of choice as did the concentration of political
power.156 By ensuring that the market remains competitive among
diverse corporations, these laws ensure that there exists a wide range
of product choices, continuing innovation and improvement, and
lower consumer prices - all important to liberal values of efficiency
and liberty. Moreover, most important from a republican standpoint,
the break-up of monopolies preserves the economic viability and
independence of small business owners. (The idea that economic
self-sufficiency is necessary to living a life of social and political
independence, and that wage labor is a kind of economic, slavery, can
be traced to the republicanism of Cicero.) "7 As monopolies were
conceived as the economic equivalent of political tyranny in that each
involves a centralized concentration of power, diversification and
dispersion of power were the solution.
As might be expected, anti-monopolistic legislation met with
concerted resistance among justices on the Supreme Court who
adhered to the classical conception of liberty.' Because of their lack
of recognition of the dangers of economic power, their obeisance to
traditional notions of absolute property rights and their fear of
increased federal power in the economy, some of the same justices
who took part in striking down anti-monopolistic legislation on
Commerce Clause grounds in the E. C. Knight'59 case in 1895 formed
the majority in the first two significant "freedom of contract" cases.
These were Allgeyer v. Louisiana"" in 1897 and Lochner v. New
York' in 1905.
Some progressives and later, communitarians, began to recognize
the importance of social, as well as economic diversity.'62 The value of
156. Cohen, supra note 38 (arguing that the right to command large numbers of
economically dependent persons plus a legally protected expectation in return on
investment, amounting to a tax on future social productivity, make a modern corporation
analogous to medieval landowners who ruled large tracts of land).
157. CICERO, supra note 59.
158. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
159. Id.
160. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
161. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
162. Sandel discusses the de-centralizing strand of progressive thought, which he
associates with Brandeis. See SANDEL, supra note 6, at 211-16. Protection of the
community against the centralizing forces of nationalism would later be a mainstay of
communitarian thought. Even among communitarians, there is a more conservative vision
and a more liberal one. Compare ROBERT NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY (1953)
(emphasizing the anti-authoritarian implications of nationalism) with ROBERT BELLAH,
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diversity as an important antidote to cultural stagnation and
individual freedom, was first systematically connected to the liberal
tradition by John Stuart Mill, in his essay On Liberty.'63 Diversity is
intimately tied to individuality, but in this case, the causal order is
reversed. A diversity of individuals makes for a diverse society:
It is not by wearing down into uniformity that which is
individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it
forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of
others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object
of contemplation, and as the works partake the character of
those who do them, by the same process human life also
becomes rich, diversified and animating.... There is a greater
fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is more
life in the units, there is more in the mass which is composed of
them.164
Mill claimed that the "despotism of custom" must be overcome,
in the name of liberty and progress, by a "plurality of paths" which
lead, ultimately, to the "many-sided development" characteristic of
modern culture.' Liberty, progress and individual happiness each
required that individuals be free to live their lives "according to their
inmost nature." '66 Diversity was ultimately an individual value, while
diversity in ways of life was a by-product - though an important by-
product - of this same value.
Nevertheless, in the subsequent development of our ideals of
social diversity - particularly diversity among sub-cultures and
relatively autonomous groups within society - it has not been
mainstream liberalism, primarily, but a blend of liberal and
communitarian ideas that have nurtured the languishing tradition of
social diversity at the level of groups.1 67 As we shall see, perhaps the
most profound tension within contemporary liberal theory is the
conflict between that species of liberalism that protects groups, and
the more modern variant, which emphasizes individual rights. One
commentator has called this the conflict between the notion that
there should exist "diversity between" groups and the idea that holds
that "diversity within" groups is preferable. This tension is made all
ET. AL., HABITS OF THE HEART (1984).
163. MILL, supra note 11.
164. Id.
165. MILL, supra note 11, at 136, 138.
166. Id. at 138.
167. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1; JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM
(1986); Galston, supra note 24.
168. William A. Galston, "The Legal and Political Implications of Moral Pluralism," 57
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the more poignant by the likelihood that each species of liberty is
itself dependent upon the other. Part III returns to this problem.
III. The Homeostatic Conception of Liberty in Modern
Constitutional Law
The homeostatic conception of the relationship between liberty,
power and diversity is powerfully evident in recent constitutional
developments. Part III briefly explores four important themes that
evince a transition from a classical liberal conception of the
relationship among state, society and the individual to that of the
homeostatic ideal: First, it examines the partial reconceptualization of
the public/private distinction in modern constitutional law. Second, it
discusses the relationship between the liberal ethic of privacy and
personal identity. Third, it will examine the right of association as a
structural right that serves to counter balance competing centers of
social power. Finally, it looks at the conflict between the right of
association, on one hand, and the individual rights of equality and
autonomy.
A. Rethinking the Meaning of the Public/Private Distinction
The state action doctrine in constitutional law is the
constitutional corollary of the classical liberal idea that negative rights
can only be violated by government, rather than by private actors.
69
In virtue of the more recent understanding that the state does not
possess a monopoly on power, and that non-governmental institutions
and organizations often wield a similar or greater degree of power
over the lives of individuals than did the state at various times in the
past, it is appropriate that individual rights should be protected
against concentrations of social power in contexts where the
individual is faced with private power in its Leviathan-like
implications. Accordingly, we should expect that the state action
doctrine will not always limit the application of constitutional rights -
i.e., that these rights may sometimes be applied as against private
MD. L. REV. 236 (1998) (comparing egalitarian liberalism and its embrace of "diversity
within" groups and more traditional liberal forms, which give precedence to associational
rights and the preference for "diversity between" groups). Galston argues in favor of the
latter conception.
169. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not authorize the federal government to protect the rights of individuals
from purported invasion by other private parties). As a recent case has stated, The Civil
Rights Cases draw a fundamental line between "deprivation by the state... and private
conduct." Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974).
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parties.
Only one provision in the entire Constitution, the Thirteenth
Amendment, was intended to protect rights from violations by private
parties. The Thirteenth Amendment outlaws slavery and involuntary
servitude within the United States and, in doing so, specifically
subjects private conduct to constitutional limitations.7' Nevertheless,
more recent cases have protected various constitutional rights against
infringement by private parties in various other situations. One
context in which this has occurred is in cases where private parties
fulfill a "public function." In Marsh v. Alabama,' perhaps the most
famous of these cases, the Court held that a private, company-owned
town could not forbid a person from distributing religious literature
on the streets of the town. The company sought to have Marsh
prosecuted under a state law for trespassing. Marsh appealed his
conviction on free speech and religion grounds, arguing that the town
had violated these constitutionally protected rights. The State argued
that these rights applied only against government actors and not
against a privately owned town. The Court dismissed the State's (and
the company's) argument that they were enforcing a private property
right, concluding that the "corporation's property interests [do not]
settle the question.' 72 Rather, the company town fulfilled all of the
basic functions of a public town and, in Justice Black's opinion, was
acting as the functional equivalent of a city.
The Marsh principle has been applied in a variety of other
contexts where private conduct assumes a public function. For
example, membership in a political party has been deemed "public"
where it is necessary to take part in a primary, as the Court ruled in
Smith v. Allwright. 73 In this case, it was not the Party's property
rights, but rather its associational rights that formed the basis of the
group's claims. What is centrally important for our purposes here is
the holding that those who had been disenfranchised were permitted
to bring a claim against the party under the Fifteenth Amendment
because of the close connection between the Democratic Party and
170. The Civil Rights Cases recognized that the Thirteenth Amendment was "primary
and direct in its character; for the Amendment is not a mere prohibition of state laws
establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary
servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States." 109 U.S. at 19.
171. 326 U.S. 501 (1946)
172. Id. at 505.
173. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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the State.174
More recently, in Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan
Valley Plaza,"' shopping centers were held to fulfill the same public
function as the company town in Marsh. The Court held that owners
of a shopping center could not prevent the peaceful labor picketing of
a supermarket within the shopping center. Thus, First Amendment
freedom of expression was protected against the private owners of the
shopping center. A subsequent case, however, limited the scope of
this ruling dramatically. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,176 the Court
undercut the Logan Valley ruling in upholding the denial of access to
a shopping center by peaceful Vietnam war protesters. The Court
distinguished Logan Valley by observing that the subject of the
picketing in the earlier case directly involved a supermarket within
the shopping center while, in Lloyd, protesters sought access to the
shopping center for expressive purposes unrelated to the shopping
center itself. In other words, the Court required a justificatory nexus
between the content of the speech and the application of
constitutional principles to non-state actors.
In some cases, the Court's reasoning that a particular exercise of
power is "public" in the state action context is predicated upon a
finding that the state has delegated authority to the private party,177 or
that it has judicially ratified or enforced private action, 78 or that it has
licensed or subsidized private conduct.1 79 Indeed, Marsh is sometimes
174. See also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (extending the application of this
ruling to the Democratic Jaybirds, an influential organization that had no formal legal
connection to the state, but whose recommendations were highly influential in the
selection of party candidates).
175. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
176. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
177. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 168-79 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that tenant was entitled to due process before the sale of her private property by
landlord in virtue of the state's authorization, under its version of the U.C.C., of "self-
help" by the landlord). Central to the controversy between the majority and dissent was
whether the state had delegated its power or merely recognized a common law right of
the landlord.
178. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (court enforcement of racially restrictive
covenant subjects the action to Equal Protection challenge).
179. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (subjecting restaurant
located within a building subsidized by the state to Equal Protection attack for racial
discrimination); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (private transportation
corporation that operates subject to state licensing and regulation is subject to due process
restrictions); but see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding that the
provision of a liquor license to a Moose lodge was not sufficient to subject the lodge to an
Equal Protection attack for discriminating against blacks).
i .......
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read in this limited way, as an instance of delegation of state power."
When interpreted in this fashion, it is possible to resist the conclusion
that the Court has recognized the need for protection of
constitutional rights against private interference. Yet the deepest
import of Marsh is that the purported "private" use of property may
become "public" for constitutional purposes when the use of property
assumes some or many of the functional characteristics of a public
forum. As Justice Black emphatically stated:
[T]he corporation's property interests [do not] settle the
question ... [Property rights do] not always mean absolute
dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights
of those who use it.181
The Logan Valley case is even more explicit in this respect, since
there was no argument that the state had subsidized or had delegated
its power to the shopping center.182
The homeostatic conception of the distinction between public
and private is distinguished from the earlier model of classical
liberalism not only by its rejection of the equivalence of public power
with the state, but in reconceiving rights as effectuating a kind of
social balance that is measured from the perspective of individual
self-determination. In weighing and evaluating public power (both in
its political and socioeconomic forms) and contrasting it with private
rights, there are four distinct factors that appear to play an important
role in this balancing process.
First, the Court must evaluate the nature of the riglht that is the
predicate for a particular constitutional claim. For example, it must
consider what function the right is supposed to have within the social
system and, more specifically, how it functions to further individual
self-determination. As we will see in the next section, while all rights
are important in preserving liberty as self-determination, some rights
protect the individual directly by shielding him from power along
180. To some extent, the decision may be read to "stand for the proposition that there
are limits on the extent to which the state may escape constitutional restraints by
'delegating' to private parties functions traditionally performed by the state." STONE ET
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1748 (3d ed. 1996).
181. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505-06 (1946).
182. It might be argued that the state has provided support through zoning or other
routine administrative regulations, but this does not reach the level of state support
needed to qualify as affirmative state involvement or encouragement or the activity. See
Moose Lodge No. 7, 407 U.S. 163 (state provisions of liquor license not sufficient to
subject private group to constitutional attack).
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what we have called the vertical social axis. Other rights function
more indirectly, by preserving social diversity along the horizontal
axis. In some cases, the use of private power will be less tolerable
when it affects the individual directly than when it threatens to upset,
at least to some degree, the social balance between competing social
institutions.
Second, the level of protection accorded certain rights is often
assessed in light of the accumulation of social power by the right-
holder. In other words, parties that have attained a certain level of
social power may be accorded less protection in special
circumstances. As particular uses have a greater affect on others
around them, these uses may become "public" for certain purposes.
Third, since one function of rights is to preserve and ensure
individual self-determination, the Court often appears to evaluate
rights from what we might call the standpoint of the "locus of
personal identity." In other words, if we view various human
activities as lying along a radius emanating outward from the most
intimate expressions of the self to those relatively less connected to
our innermost personal identity, the Court appears to protect more
stringently those rights connected to choices and actions that fall
more closely to the center of our concept of selfhood. In this respect,
the "privacy" of an action will be a function of its proximity to the
locus of personal identity. Section III.C. will examine further the
need to evaluate actions for their effects from the standpoint of the
locus of personal identity.
Finally, the Court must consider the extent to which prevailing
social conditions make the exercise of a right possible or meaningful.
In some cases, this may require in part an assessment of whether
social conditions exist that permit alternative means of expression of
the right.
The determination that a particular use or activity is public is a
function of one or more of these four factors. In Marsh, the first
three factors played an important role in the Court's reasoning. As
indicated earlier, the second factor is predominant because the town
possessed many of the indicia of public sovereignty on a small scale.
It possessed the best of both worlds, public and private, in that it
enforced a system of law-like rules by which the town was governed,
yet it also determined the rent paid by workers housed in the town,
ran company stores from which employees purchased necessities and,
of course, actually employed the workers. Thus, the company had a
large degree of private economic power over the lives of workers and
their families, even as it exercised some of the prerogatives of public
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power. In various important ways, the town had more power than
either public authorities or private property owners.
Nevertheless, the first and third factors were important as well.
The right to the free exercise of religion, and to freedom of speech in
matters of religion, involve rights most closely connected to the
values of individualism. Consider, for example, that the town would
most certainly not have been held to the standard of a state actor with
respect to the Establishment Clause: If the company had erected an
Episcopal Church in the center of town, the Court would not have
determined that there had been a constitutional violation
notwithstanding the social power exercised by the company (The
Establishment Clause, as we will argue below, is a structural provision
not as directly connected to the value of self-determination as the
Free Exercise and Speech clauses). This indicates that the nature of
the rights involved in Marsh-the freedom of religion and of
expression-and their close nexus to personal self-determination,
were also vitally important.
In Logan Valley, the first, third and fourth factors were
predominant, though a consideration of the second may have played
a role as well. Because the speech involved concerned the labor
practices by a supermarket located within the shopping center, there
was a close connection between the subject of the speech and the lives
of the workers who peacefully picketed the store. Moreover, as we
shall see in the next section, because an important function of the
right of free expression is to "talk back" to the institution that is the
subject of the speech, it was important that the demonstration take
place in the vicinity of the market. Finally, the lack of available and
meaningful alternative channels of expression - i.e., the fact that, in
modern society, shopping malls serve as the functional equivalent of
the commons or town square - required access to these places
generally. The first and third factors are also arguably less weighty in
the Lloyd case, where protestors were not "talking back" directly to
those who were the object of their speech. While the Court
undervalued, in the author's opinion, the importance of the fourth
factor in reaching its decision in Lloyd, the distinction between the
Logan Valley and Lloyd decisions can be explained by reference to
the differences between these factors.
Finally, this approach to rights and their relationship to the
public/private distinction assist us in clearing up other constitutional
anomalies in the state action area. For example, in Shelly v.
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Kraemer,83 the Court held that a private, racially discriminatory
restrictive covenant became "public," and subject to constitutional
attack on Equal Protection grounds, upon enforcement by the state
courts. Critics responded that this would subject potentially every
manner of private activity to constitutional attack in the event of
court enforcement. For example, Robert Bork described a
hypothetical situation in which a homeowner ejects a guest for his
political views. If the guest were to sue and a court were to uphold
the property owner's right to eject the guest, Shelley would appear to
require that this ruling itself be subject to attack under the First
Amendment." In other words, private guests would have to be
accorded First Amendment protection against the speech-limiting
effects of the political preferences of homeowners. This case is
clearly distinguishable from Shelley, however, because of the greater
intimacy of the homeowner's rights in the sanctity of his own home
vis a vis that of the parties to the restrictive covenant in Shelley, and
the almost unlimited availability of alternative means of expression
on a small scale open to the ejected guest.
The four factors just discussed are interrelated in a variety of
ways. In the following two sections, we embark on a general
consideration of issues concerning the recognition and treatment of
rights along two dimensions. Recall that in Part Two of the Article,
liberty was described as a function of power relations along two
distinct axes." The first, vertical axis represents the relationship
between the individual and the particular political and social
institutions-the state, corporations, private groups and associations,
etc. - with which he interacts and through which he takes part in
government, society and the economy. The second, horizontal axis
represents the relationship among these various groups and
organizations. Accordingly, rights have two general functions and
should be understood to operate along both of these axes,
respectively. The first function of rights comes closest to the negative
liberal ideal, as evidenced both in classical and contemporary forms
of liberalism. They protect the individual in the pursuit of a range of
183. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
184. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 151-53 (1990).
185. This may still not be enough to distinguish Bork's example from Shelley, however.
The private home seller does not differ materially from the private home owner in Shelley,
nor do the positions of the plaintiffs vary substantially. Thus, the criticism of Shelley - that
it threatens to make "public" every exercise of private choice when ratified by the Court -
is not easily refuted.
186. BORK, supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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personal interests and activities from various forms of social and
political invasion. In sum, these rights function along the vertical axis
that defines the relationship between individual and group. The
second function of rights serves a structural purpose. Rights are
invoked in this sense to preserve a climate of social diversity along the
horizontal axis of social power. These rights protect the individual
indirectly; they do not serve as "shields" to social power but as
empowering devices that permit the individual to invoke various
protections in the name of preserving a counterbalance of social
power.
The following section examines the vertical axis as it relates to
the notion of self-determination, personal identity and social power.
In sections III.C.-E., we take up a consideration of problems
concerning the horizontal axis. This will involve a discussion of the
role of rights in their structural function as a means of ensuring social
pluralism or diversity.
B. Privacy, Self-Determination and the Locus of Personal Identity
This section begins with what is perhaps one of the most difficult
problems to vex attempts to justify liberalism. This problem transects
and yet, transcends, and attempts to distinguish the public and private
spheres of activity. Why may a private homeowner stand on his
property rights to eject the unwanted guest for expression of views he
finds objectionable while the owner of the shopping center may not
be permitted to do so under certain circumstances? Why, pursuant to
their rights of privacy and association, are private parties free to
discriminate on the basis of race in the choice of their marital partners
while business and government are prohibited from using race in
hiring and related decisions? Why are small family-operated
businesses exempt from many of the statutory requirements
incumbent upon larger firms?
The answer to these kinds of issues lies in the central importance,
within the liberal tradition, of the idea that there should exist either
protection for a core self 87 or, somewhat less substantively, a "locus of
personal identity" that represents the innermost aspects of every
individual's self-conception. The closer we move to the center of the
locus of personal identity, the more proximate the nexus to issues
187. See John Lawrence Hill, Law and the Concept of the Core Self: Toward a
Reconciliation of Naturalism and Humanism, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 289 (1997); Meir Dan-
Cohen, The Concept of the Self and the Limits of Responsibility, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959
(1992).
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involving individual self-determination. As the Court has stated in a
discussion concerning the protection afforded intimate relationships:
the constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects
the realization that individuals draw much of their emotional
enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting these
relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore
safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity
that is central to any concept of liberty. 188
Associational values are necessary to the individual's capacity to
define, even as they are equally important in giving the individual a
means of communication with those beyond the group.
The value of privacy has played a central role in modern liberal
ideals precisely because they reflect our intuitive ideas regarding a
continuum that runs from the most intimate aspects of our self-
conception to those undertakings that are less connected to personal
identity and the values of privacy. Indeed, we put such a high priority
on self-determination as a manifestation of one's personal identity
that we protect private choices even when they appear to conflict with
the public principles we recognize as morally binding in other
contexts (e.g., racially discriminatory romantic preferences). At the
other end of the spectrum, certain uses and activities that are in some
respects protected as private property or associations, but that fall
outside of this locus of personal identity, attain significance as public
in nature when they become "public" either in the sense that they
embody some of the vestiges of political sovereignty or represent a
given concentration of social power, or when, under prevailing social
conditions, they function as a channel or conduit of access to the
expression of rights having public significance.
The relationship between privacy and self-determination is a
complex one. It is noteworthy, for example, that many decisions of
the Supreme Court recognize a close relationship between privacy
and other rights which are, themselves, important to self-
determination. Indeed, sometimes these rights are nearly
indistinguishable from privacy issues. For example, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, the Court recognized the rights of Amish families to take their
children out of public schools after the eighth grade, two years before
the state-mandated minimum for the education of children, on
grounds of free exercise of religion and the privacy to raise one's
children as one deems fit. 89 Privacy is sometimes closely connected
188. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
189. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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with associational interests, particularly in the context of claims
involving "intimate association" or family interests, as in Moore v.
East Cleveland.'" Similarly, privacy issues are deeply intertwined
with the right to marry.' Finally, Skinner v. Oklahoma struck down a
state sterilization statute on grounds that it violated a right to
procreate, but subsequent cases regard Skinner as a forerunner to the
privacy right.' 92  Indeed, so much has the privacy idea infused
contemporary conceptions of liberty, that recent substantive due
process jurisprudence is virtually indistinguishable from a general
right to privacy.
The deep connection between privacy, self-determination and
the locus of personal identity is evident in privacy right protection of
a range of intimate human activities including sexual intimacy within
marriage, procreation, abortion, the right of families to live together
and the right to marry, among others.' The Court has also fallen
short of full protection of this right, however, in a number of other
cases. For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, decided in 1986, the
Court narrowly upheld a state law that criminalized unconventional
sexual acts that were private and consensual.94 Four years later, the
Court upheld a state's efforts to prevent the removal of a patient in a
permanent vegetative state from life support, though the Court did
incidentally recognize the existence of such a right.'9 And in 1997,
190. See 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking a local ordinance that had the effect of
preventing various members of an extended family from living together). While the
majority treats this as a due process claim related to privacy, the dissent characterizes it as
an associational claim. Cases involving the right of familial autonomy are presaged by two
early cases, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking a law prohibiting the
teaching of foreign languages) and Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking
a law prohibiting students from attending private schools). These cases, too, use the Due
Process clause to closely intertwine privacy-like interests with associational concerns.
191. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (fundamental interest in
marriage required striking a law that required that applicant for marriage license have no
unpaid child support payments).
192. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Skinner is mentioned as a predicate for the privacy rights
cases in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) and numerous other such cases. To the
extent that these latter cases involve the "right not to procreate," they appear the inverse
of the Skinner right. See Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship and Sexual
Privacy - Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983)
(comparing right to procreate and right not to procreate).
193. See ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
(1997) (comparing the various strands of our conceptions of privacy in tort law,
constitutional law and other areas).
194. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia sodomy law).
195. Cruzan v. Director, MO. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upholding
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the Court held that there is no constitutional right of a terminally ill
patient to enlist the services of a third party for purposes to bring
about his death.' These latter cases evince the extent to which even
liberals have been reluctant to embrace a full-bodied conception of
self-determination. For, if self-determination means anything, it
should encompass the idea that individuals have plenary control over
acts involving sexual intimacy and those that concern the most
fundamental choices regarding when, and under what circumstances,
to end one's own life. While the Supreme Court has never heard
other such challenges, any coherent conception of the right of self-
determination should also include choices involving collaborative
reproduction,'97  those involving bilaterally consensual sexual
decisions, even where they may involve a commercial transaction, and
the right to use specified mind-altering substances in the context of
religious ceremonies."'
These conclusions may seen radical to some, but they are
certainly far less radical, in our own time, than was the contention, at
the turn of the seventeenth century, that each individual should
possess full religious liberty to worship the faith of his choice or, at
the turn of the eighteenth century, that citizens possess a right openly
to criticize their rulers or, at the turn of the nineteenth century, that
government should guarantee full political equality to African
Americans or, at the turn of the twentieth century, that there should
exist an inalienable right to sexual intimacy, or even simply to use
contraception. Modern or "progressive" liberals have often joined
with conservatives in accepting broad limitations on individual
liberty, though for quite distinct reasons. Where conservatives are
typically motivated by moralistic concerns, liberals are moved by
requirement of "clear and convincing evidence" that patient would have wanted to die
before termination of life support could take place).
196. Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (no right of terminally ill to
"assisted suicide").
197. State supreme courts have held that the right to procreate does not include the
right to use a surrogate mother contract. In re Baby M., 539 A.2d 810 (1988). See John
Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean To Be A Parent? The Claims of Biology as the Basis of
Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1991) (arguing that such a right should be
recognized.)
198. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 892 (1990) (the Court
held that the use of peyote in a Native American religious ritual was not protected by the
Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment. Certainly, if an exemption was not
permitted in this case, the Court would not recognize a more general privacy right to use
such substances that would apply to all.).
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paternalistic purposes." In their understandable zeal to protect the
liberty of the individual against the external encroachments of various
social and political forces, modern liberals too often have sought to
protect the individual from the claimed inner effects of social
influence within the inner sanctum of his own psychic processes.2" In
seeking to equalize, to some extent, the social power of the individual
vis a vis the group, modern liberals too readily find the residue of
group conditioning, rather than evidence of reasoned decision-
making, in the choices of the individual. In sum, where modern
conservatives do not trust the will of the agent, modern liberals put
little stock in his reason.
Indeed, one of the most striking developments in the trajectory
of liberal thought from its classical to its contemporary variants is the
movement, from moralistic to paternalistic modes of justification,
with respect to the increasing number of laws that limit private and
consensual activity. Where, during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, laws prohibiting contraception, abortion,
fornication, adultery, prostitution, polygamy, suicide, drug use,
gambling and a variety of other activities were predicated upon a
conception of harm to the community or to the moral tenor of the
social order, today they are founded on an almost pious concern for
the welfare of the participants themselves." ' In sum, in contrast to the
salutary efforts of progressives to equalize power relations between
199. Following John Stuart Mill, liberals often distinguish the motivation for various
laws into three categories. Harm-based laws seek to prevent a direct harm to third parties.
One person's liberty is limited to protect another. Paternalistic laws seek to prevent harm
to the participants in the proscribed activity. Their freedom is limited for their own
welfare. Moralistic concerns are those that prohibit certain behavior because of the
sentiment on the part of the community that a particular act is wrongful, even if an
assignable harm to particular agents does not exist. See FEINBERG, supra note 45
(discussing philosophical justification of paternalism); LORD PATRICK DEVLIN, THE
ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1962) (for a classic conservative defense of morals
legislation). See, e.g., RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, MORALITY AND THE LAW (1971)
(for various readings on the problem of legal moralism).
200. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 44.
201. It is striking that this attitude has influenced appellate litigation in these areas.
For example, in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the state argued that there were two
state interests - protecting the life of the fetus and protecting the health and life of the
mother. The first is a harm-based justification (assuming the moral status of the fetus as a
person) and the second is paternalistic. Attorneys for the State made a conscious decision
not to present a third interest-the purported immorality of abortion or its adoption as a
means "to discourage illicit sexual conduct." Id. at 130. Similarly, where polygamy was
condemned as a moral abomination a century ago, see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878) (upholding bigamy conviction against Free Exercise attack), it is today attacked
by conservatives, feminists and others as being exploitative of women.
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social and economic institutions and individuals, the dark side of
modern progressivism has been its willingness to limit individual
liberty in the name of individual security or well-being. Writing in the
1830s, half a century before the rise of modern progressivism, de
Tocqueville saw clearly the consequences of the drift toward
centralization and paternalism. He wrote:
But if a despotism should be established among the democratic
nations of our day, it... would be more widespread and milder;
it would degrade men rather than torment them .... Such
words as despotism and tyranny do not fit .... Over [these
diminished men] stands an immense, protective power which is
alone responsible for securing their enjoyment and watching
over their fate. That power is absolute, thoughtful of detail,
orderly, provident and gentle. It would resemble parental
authority if, father-like, it tried to prepare its charges for a
man's life, but on the contrary, it tries to keep them in perpetual
childhood .... It gladly works for their happiness but wants to
be the sole agent and judge of it .... Thus, it daily makes the
exercise of free choice less useful and rare, restricts the activity
of free will within a narrower compass and, little by little, robs
each citizen of the proper use of his own faculties.2
de Tocqueville observed that this is achieved when government
"covers the whole of social life with a network of petty, complicated
rules that are both minute and uniform., 23 This modern form of soft
despotism has profound implications for our conception of self-
determination in that it "does not break men's will, but softens, bends
and guides it" until "each nation is no more than a flock of timid and




To put the point from the perspective of a philosophical
conception of individuality, if the central value of liberalism is the
protection of individualism, in its modern and life-affirming sense, we
must recognize, in a juridical sense, a loosely circumscribed sphere of
personal identity from which choices and acts emanate. It is this
sphere that we surround and protect with privacy-like rights and it is
this sphere that we empower when we seek, in a variety of ways, to
equalize the social footing of the individual vis a vis the group. Taken
to its inevitable extreme, the tendency of modern liberal thought,
under the influence of an exaggerated sense of the omnipotence of
the social, explains away human choices and acts as manifestations of
external influence until what we have traditionally understood as the
202. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 691-92.
203. Id. at 692.
204. Id.
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locus of personal identity disappears into a point. In this event,
nothing is left of the person in any substantive, morally or legally
recognizable sense. Under paternalistic regimes, the self truly does
become, as Jean-Paul Sartre characterized it, "a cold wind blowing
from nowhere."2 °5
With nothing left of the idea of human individuality in its active
sense - as the reflective originator of action-the central animating
force of liberalism can no longer be sustained.
C. Social Pluralism and the Right of Association as a Structural Right
We now arrive at what is the central tension in modern liberal
theory: Self-determination requires social diversity, and social
diversity requires self-determination. Without a plural society, with
its wonderful bounty of options, choices, and modes of individual self-
manifestation, individual liberty remains an impoverished and
unrealized ideal. At the same time, to the extent that the individual is
not free to live and express his identity in his choices, actions and life
pursuits, social diversity is hobbled by the limiting range of available
modes of personal expression. The two ideals are symbiotic in their
relationship. Indeed, the value of privacy tells only half the tale of
individual autonomy or self-determination, and the passive half at
that. The self must be protected from the great leveling force of
social influences that threaten to submerge it, but an excessive
emphasis on privacy obscures the other side of self-determination: the
expressive and active side. As the poet Dante observed seven
centuries ago:
[I]n every human action what is primarily intended by the doer,
whether he acts from natural necessity or out of free will, is the
disclosure of his own image. Hence it comes about that every
doer, in so far as he does, takes delight in doing, since
everything that is desires its own being, and since in action the
being of the doer is somehow intensified, delight necessarily
follows. Thus, nothing acts unless [by acting] it makes patent its
latent self 
6
If privacy protects the nascent or developing self from potentially
debilitating external influence, then its counterpart is the capacity to
express oneself, to project one's identity, in the external world.
In liberal societies, persons express themselves, among other
ways, through involvement in groups. Indeed, liberal societies are
205. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS (Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1956).
206. Quoted in ARENDT, supra note 56, at 175.
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distinguished from totalitarian regimes, including some of the more
severe forms of republicanism," by its embrace of a right of
association that facilitates social pluralism.2" The right of association
functions both to protect self-determination, by providing a social
channel for meaningful individual expression, but also in the second
way in which rights operate, as a structural safeguard against the
state, and against other social groups. It is here that we return to the
theme of Part One of the Article. The breakdown of negative and
positive conceptions of liberty means not only that individual liberty
is uniquely distinct from liberty as non-interference by government,
on one hand, and the right to take part in self-government, on the
other. The first, negative, ideal retains its symbolic value for
Americans, but it rarely reflected legal reality, and the second,
positive, ideal was never even possible in a large scale society - at
least as it was traditionally championed by republicans. Nevertheless,
it is in virtue of his connection with smaller groups and associations
that the individual today can experience liberty in its positive aspect.
As a member of a group, in making policy or in exercising personal
judgment and discretion over a range of matters, he is closer to
power, even though he exercises discretion over only a small sphere
of activity. At the same time, overall social power is, as Madison said,
"broken into so many parts, classes and interests of citizens, that the
rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger of
interested combinations of the majority.''2°.
The greater autonomy we accord such groups, the greater the
sphere of self-government within the group. Moreover, the greater
the number of groups, the more unique and distinct each group is
likely to be, offering in turn, a greater range of possible choices to
each individual. The greater the number of groups, the smaller they
are likely to be, proportionally, offering the individual a relatively
greater quantum of positive liberty, within the confines of each group,
though over a relatively more circumscribed area of influence. Thus,
associational interests advance both the values of negative and
positive liberty. Finally, the greater the number of diverse groups, the
less likely will the government need to intervene to reestablish a lost
207. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 64, at 204 (civil associations are to be discouraged, if
not banned, in the republic, so that there shall be no mediation between individual and
state).
208. U.S. CONST. amend I: "Congress shall make no law... abridging ... the right of
the people peaceably to assemble."
209. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 22, at 358.
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social balance that occurs when too much power is concentrated in
one group or in one particular sector of society. The homeostatic
conception of liberty - both as it applies to individual self-
determination and to the rights of groups - thrives on diversity.
Thus, the right of association does not operate primarily on the
vertical axis of social power - the dimension that relates the individual
to larger groups - as do such rights as the privacy right, the right to the
free exercise of religion or the right to freedom of expression."'
These function largely negatively, as we have seen, to protect the
individual from unwanted social influence. In contrast, the right of
association resembles the Establishment clause and a particular
reading of the Press clause discussed earlier.T All three of these
clauses are structural in nature in that they serve to prevent the
concentration of power in the State, rather than civil society, and do
so by preventing both the capture of private interests by the State, and
the capture of the State by private interests. In other words, structural
rights protect social pluralism by preventing the state from adopting
one group as its own, investing it with the indicia of state power and
eliminating other competing groups. The Establishment clause does
this in an obvious way, by proscribing state involvement in religion.
The Press clause ensures that the state does not possess a monopoly
on information and influence."2 And the right of association ensures
social diversity from the "ground up" by ensuring that individuals
have meaningful input into groups, and by guaranteeing the integrity
of groups from state interference. Each of these rights preserves a
proper distribution of power laterally, among groups, along what we
have described as the horizontal axis of social power.
The right of association can be infringed and undermined in any
210. The Supreme Court has clearly distinguished two types of association, the
intimate association that evokes notions of privacy, and that operates as a negative value
protecting individuals from social interference, and expressive associations. See Roberts v.
U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1904). The latter are protected under the First
Amendment as a necessary accompaniment to the effective protection of freedom of
speech. It is, thus, this second type of association that is described here as a structural
safeguard.
211. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (discussing this structural
conception of the right to freedom of the press).
212. One important difference between the Establishment clause and the Press clause
is that, while the former prohibits the state from any involvement with religion altogether,
the Press clause does not prohibit the State from establishing a newspaper, for example.
The reason for the difference, however, is the result of important historic problems with
state involvement in religion, whereas the state has never been a threat to the diversity of
news sources as such.
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of a variety of ways. In addition to outright proscription of such
groups, government can withhold privileges 213 or affirmatively
penalize individuals 24 for their involvement in unpopular groups or
expressions of similar opinion. The state can attempt to require
disclosure of private membership lists or those of financial
supporters."5 Finally, it can seek to interfere with the internal
organization of groups, particularly by influencing its membership
policies."6 In a sense, the latter method is the most subversive of such
interferences, since it undermines group autonomy even while
purporting to expand the membership of the group.
The protection of group rights through the right of association
ensures all of the traditional values associated with social pluralism.
It prevents the concentration of power in the state, both by breaking
up combinations of interests and by fulfilling essential social
functions, preventing expanded state involvement in various aspects
of our lives. In both ways, it serves the negative value of limiting
government. Moreover, social pluralism facilitates the expression of
positive liberty by fostering individual involvement in the sphere of
activities embraced by various groups. It further enriches individual
choice by giving persons a diverse assortment of channels of social
expression, and it serves the liberal impulse to innovation,
experimentation and social progress by permitting social comparisons
between different life experiments or modes of individual existence.
Still, as we will see in the next section, even with all it has to offer, the
legal protection of social pluralism is on the wane today, the victim of
its inevitable conflict with the central value of progressive liberalism -
equality.
D. Diversity versus Equality: The Problem of Getting In
The deepest conflict in contemporary liberalism is that of the
conflict between individual and group rights or, more specifically,
213. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (examining and remanding, for further
consideration, decision of state college to deny recognition of Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS)).
214. Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (state university
could not expel student for distributing newspaper with cartoon depicting a policeman
raping the Statue of Liberty and using the term "Mother Fucker").
215. Brown v. Socialist Workers 74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87 (1982)
(disclosure provisions of state campaign finance law could not be constitutionally applied
to socialist workers party).
216. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984) (upholding state law requiring group to accept women members).
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between the values of equality and autonomy, on one hand, and those
of association, on the other. In this and the last section of the Article,
we will focus briefly on two such problems, respectively. We will
refer to these as "the problem of getting in" and "the problem of
getting out." In some of the most significant decisions over the
course of the past thirty years, and with profound implications for the
future of liberalism, the Supreme Court has had to address these
issues.
The problem of "getting in" involves cases where associations
may wish to exclude individuals from group membership for a variety
of reasons that are repugnant to our commitments to equality,
including considerations of race, gender and sexual orientation. One
of the most important of recent cases, in this respect, is Roberts v U.S.
Jaycees.217 The Jaycees were a nonprofit organization dedicated to
assisting young men, ages 18 to 35, in pursuing careers in business by
providing them with informal business "connections" and other
opportunities for becoming involved in the business community.
Older men and women were permitted membership as associate
members, but could not vote on association policies or hold office.
Women members brought suit under a state civil rights statute which
prohibited discrimination on the basis of gender. The Jaycees
responded by asserting their associational rights under the First
Amendment. Their argument, in essence, was that the state should
have no role in determining the membership of a private
association-i.e., that the group's self-determination of membership
was the quintessence of the right of association. The Court ruled that,
although the statute infringed upon the group's internal organization,
the state interest in promoting gender equality met the requisites of
strict scrutiny and upheld the law."' A concurring opinion by Justice
O'Connor went further and held that the Jaycees were not an
expressive association at all for purposes of the First Amendment,
and upheld the law on rational basis grounds.219
Perhaps the central irony of the case is that the Jaycees had long
admitted women as associate members. Women members had the
benefit of the "goods and services" - the employment connections and
the financial opportunities - which the Court claimed could only be
advanced by the statute. Thus, the Court was "crying wolf" in
insisting upon the removal of "barriers to economic advancement and
217. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
218. Id. at 623.
219. Id.. at 631-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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political and social integration, ,220 since women members were denied
only the privileges of holding office within the group and voting on
association policies. The irony consists in the fact that, if the purpose
of the association had been to advocate men's causes in some way
that would have required the total exclusion of women, the Court's
reasoning appears to indicate that they would have been protected 2
It was only because the group sought a reasonable middle-ground
that they were subjected to constitutional attack. This approach has
the affect of forcing groups into either one of two directions: they
either accept the full embrace of state regulation by being recognized
as a public accommodation, or they are driven to the fringe, where
the relative severity of their "message" permits them to insulate
themselves, even as their influence is minimized. Nazis may reject
Zionists, and the Ku Klux Klan black applicants (who may believe
they can reform the group internally), but any group seeking a
modicum of social influence is driven in the direction of adopting
moderate policies which, in virtue of this moderation, open them to
the reach of the Roberts rationale-the claim that extending
membership will not alter their (moderate) message. The Court has
followed the Roberts ruling in a number of other cases involving
gender discrimination,"' yet has declined to follow the rule in cases
involving discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 223
The results often turn on the Court's assessment as to whether
requiring the group to accept the outsiders will alter its central
message for expressive purposes. For example, in the recent Boy
Scout case it held that requiring the admission of gay scoutmasters
would alter the fundamental message and nature of the Scouts.22 4 Yet,
220. Id. at 626.
221. The Court stated that, "There is no basis in the record for concluding that the
admission of women as full voting members will impede the organization's ability to
engage in these protected activities." Id. at 627. Apparently, if inclusion of women would
have had this effect, in the Court's opinion, they would have had the shelter of the First
Amendment.
222. Bd. of Directors of Rotary Club Int'l. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 US. 537
(1987) (upholding state statute that required rotary club to admit women); N.Y. State
Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (upholding antidiscrimination ordinance
against private social club).
223. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
(1995) (ruling that the associational rights of St. Patrick's day parade organizers trumped a
state statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); Boy Scouts of
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (associational rights of Boy Scouts trump the state anti-
discrimination statute, permitting them to exclude homosexuals).
224. 530 U.S. at 657-58.
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surely only the group itself can determine what its nature, purpose
and message is supposed to be. To permit the Court to decide for any
group what its nature of message must be is to permit the government
to define or redefine any group to which the principle applies in or
out of existence as a self-governing entity. Moreover, the apparently
inconsistent nature of the rulings provokes skepticism regarding the
neutrality of the Court's value commitments - i.e., that groups are free
to reject gays and lesbians, but not women.
The Roberts decision reflects the extent to which the power of
the modern state has expanded apace with contemporary conceptions
of equality, while the power of groups has proportionally been
diminished. Yet, it is the structural significance of the decision that is
most troubling. From a structural standpoint, the decision
undermines the autonomy of groups not only in the obvious way-by
infringing upon the internal membership and policies of
associations-but in a more profound, if indirect way as well. First,
the decision operates as a "quick fix" for the claims of outsiders,
thereby discouraging the formation of new and competing groups -
i.e., groups that function to give women the same opportunities that
the Jaycees gave men. The long-term effect of applying these kinds of
public accommodations laws to private groups and association, even
when they are as large as the Jaycees, is the reduction in the
particularity of groups. Such laws break down associational
boundaries by fostering "diversity within" groups, as opposed to
"diversity between" them, as William Galston has observed.22
Accordingly, groups become larger, fewer in number with more
generalized "messages." They are driven to the "middle," resulting in
a yawning uniformity among and across groups on what we have
described as the horizontal axis. True diversity, in its daring and
audacious implications, is undermined.
This in turn effects the aggregative consequences of social
pluralism, to the inversion of the Madisonian understanding of
liberty. As the counter-balance of interests operates within, rather
than across, groups, rendering their identity less and less distinct,
there are fewer opportunities for groups to reflect the peculiar
attachments of individuals. This serves to weaken the bond between
individuals and groups. Further, as this process of dilution and
centralization continues, as groups become larger and less focal, the
prospect of meaningful participation - the experience of liberty in its
225. Galston, supra note 168.
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positive dimension - fades. And, finally, with the progressive dilution
of group identity, each group comes to appear increasingly like the
general population. Taken to its logical extreme, the process
ultimately renders meaningless group membership itself, as a group
consisting of a representative sample of the general population has no
more and no less power vis a vis the state than does the general
population in the absence of the group.
This, of course, is the extreme picture, the logical extreme, the
end of a long road to which we have only provisionally committed
ourselves. The Roberts decision takes only a small though important
step in the wrong direction. In a broader sense, the Roberts decision
and its progeny reflect other developments within our society that
have diminished the significance of groups of all sizes and functions,
from that of the family to various political and social organizations.226
The protection of groups should not be taken as an indication that
equality is not valued, for equality is an important value in the
homeostatic ideal of liberty, any more than the protection of
controversial speech indicates disregard for the rights of those against
whom the speaker inveighs. Rather, protection for the autonomy of
groups evinces a skepticism of centralized power, a commitment to
social pluralism and a hope that liberty in something like its positive
aspect has not been lost to us forever.
E. Diversity versus Self-Determination: The Problem of Getting Out
In contrast to the problem of getting in, which typically involves
a tension between equality and association, the "problem of getting
out" involves the conflict between individual autonomy and group
rights. Put simply and starkly, to what extent should a liberal society
tolerate the abridgement of certain of the rights of group members in
the name of social pluralism? 227
226. See NISBET, supra note 162 (sounding the alarm that increasing state involvement
in civil society was not simply a symptom, but a cause, of the progressive dissolution of
civil society).
227. Liberals have long argued about the potential conflict between liberty and
pluralism, at least where social pluralism is predicated upon moral pluralism. Where
social pluralism represents a state of affairs where different sub-cultures peacefully coexist
within a more general liberal culture, moral pluralism is a philosophical doctrine that holds
that diverse values cannot be compared. There are no distinct measures of morality.
Different values may compete, and yet be defensible moral options. When liberalism is
based upon moral pluralism, it is because liberal culture permits for a greater variety of
expressions of diverse values. Liberal culture is a means, in this case, to fostering moral
pluralism. If there exist worthwhile ways of life that are illiberal (e.g., that emphasize such
values as fundamentalist religious orthodoxy, which privileges religious over liberal
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Wisconsin v. Yoder228 represents the conflict at its most piquant.
In Yoder, the Court recognized the right of Amish parents to take
their children out of school after the eighth grade, rather than after
the tenth, as mandated by state law. What is significant for our
purposes here is that the case posed a conflict between the rights of
the group to educate and insulate their children from secular
influences - to inculcate in their children respect for the Amish way of
life - and what we might describe as the children's right to develop
autonomous selves. Central to the conflict was the intention of the
Amish to prevent their children's exposure to the secular way of
life-a way of life that they might prefer to the Amish way if they
were to experience it. This was the focus of Justice Douglas' dissent.
Justice Douglas argued that these children were being systematically
deprived of the education necessary to make a choice between the
secular and the Amish lifestyles, that they were being indoctrinated,
rather than being permitted to make their own choice. Douglas
feared that the children might be "forever barred from entry into the
new and amazing world of diversity that we have today" and that
their "entire life may be stunted and deformed." '229
The homeostatic conception of liberty places primary emphasis
upon the value of self-determination. Of deepest importance to our
concept of self-determination is the idea that, while the members of
groups may relinquish certain civil rights within the context of group
life - e.g., they may give up their property or take a vow of silence or
permit group leaders to search their personal effects - there exist a set
of rights which may never be relinquished to anyone in a liberal
society. These are the rights that protect individuality and self-
determination in their essential aspects. Such rights would include
the following: First, persons retain the right of exit from the group.
Second, they retain the rights of life and well-being. And, third, they
may never be deprived of the right to develop the capacity for
autonomous decision-making, itself necessary to self-determination.
Social pluralism is both an expression of, and a necessary means
to, self-determination. Diversity flows from individuality and
values) the liberal who embraces moral pluralism would appear to have to defend
inclusion of these cultures in the name of moral pluralism. See JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH
BERLIN 141-68 (1996) (discussing this conflict in the context of Berlin's moral pluralism).
While social pluralism may be based upon moral pluralism, however, it need not
necessarily be so. In our case, social pluralism is a means to self-determination. Thus, as
we will see, self-determination limits diversity where they conflict.
228. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
229. Id. at 245-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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individuality, in any meaningful sense, from the reflective choices of
individuals. A group may not maintain its social position by
brainwashing or otherwise seeking to limit the capacity for
autonomous choice on the part of its members. Where the group
seeks to limit the development of this same capacity for individual
choice, pluralism must yield to liberty and the rights of association to
those of autonomy. These are the limits to social pluralism because
they are the requisites of liberalism, and they are the requisites of
liberalism because they are necessary to the values of individuality
and self-determination upon which liberalism is based.
While Yoder poses the potential conflict between these
principles, it is not itself a difficult case. In virtue of the exposure
these children had to the secular world, both as a result of their
elementary education and because of the almost certain influence of
the media and other influences of the outside world, their capacity to
choose had not been impaired in this case. Indeed, in a sense the
Amish children may have been accorded more choice than their
secular contemporaries, who were never exposed to anything other
than their own secular lifestyle. Justice Douglas' pretensions to the
value of autonomy in this case may have been little more than an
unconscious bias in favor of the modern "world of diversity."
Ironically, however, a far richer conception of diversity prevailed.
IV. Conclusion
At a time when our conceptions of the nature of liberty have
largely coalesced into the contemporary ideal of individual self-
determination, there persist two dominant though divergent paths,
each of which promises to lead us, collectively, to our goal. On the
right are the modern descendants of classical liberalism, most
prominently libertarians of various stripes and the devotees of law
and economics. They follow in the footsteps of Hobbes and
Bentham, and insist that state regulation represents the primary limit
on liberty. For those holding this position, it is not the function of
government to promote liberty, but only to preserve the liberty of
individuals by protecting a limited number of civil rights, most
particularly the rights to property and freedom of contract. 3 For
classical liberals, any conception of equality other than formal
equality of opportunity must conflict with negative liberty.
230. See NOZICK, supra note 5 (for the modern libertarian defense of the limited
state).
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Moreover, social background conditions are viewed to be distinct
from, and largely irrelevant to, the fairness of legal rules, which are to
be judged on their own terms by reference to more abstract standards
of neutrality and justice. For these negative liberals, government
should refrain from involving itself in the sphere of the social to the
greatest extent possible, consistent with the protection of personal
and property rights.
On the left are progressives, social democrats and their fellow
travelers who view the centralized state as the only ally of the
ordinary individual today. They typically harbor deeply egalitarian
sentiments that run in the direction of various substantive forms of
social leveling; they tend to equate liberty with equality, and equality
with equality of condition."' Consequently, for this group, the state
functions to promote liberty by closing the gap between formal
equality of opportunity and equality of outcome or condition. For
progressives, the social and the legal are inextricably intertwined.
There is scarcely a social evil that cannot be cured with a little more
government.
Between these two ideas stands a third theory of liberty. It is
neither purely negative nor positive, in either sense of the term
"positive" as it is used today.232 And it disavows the progressive
penchant to satisfy "the two conflicting passions" for negative liberty
and for the all-embracing protection of the tutelary powers of the
state, as de Tocqueville put it in the opening quote.233  The
homeostatic ideal is moved by the same distrust of concentrated
power that animates classical liberalism, but shares with the
progressive the recognition that this insight must be applied to the
whole of society. Liberty as self-determination requires that a
meaningful range of options and choices exist within the great sphere
of civil society. To accomplish this, it is necessary to loosen state
control over both the individual, with respect to our private choices,
and with respect to the internal membership of groups, bearing in
mind that it is only through groups that individuals may experience
the positive values of collective self-determination while contributing
to the liberal values associated with diversity.
Is this conception of freedom more libertarian or more
communitarian than mainstream liberalism today? In a sense, it is
231. See Dworkin, supra note 35 (arguing for exactly this conception of liberty, which
he calls "liberty as equal concern and respect").
232. See supra note 40 (discussing the various senses of the term "positive liberty").
233. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 693.
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both, and it is neither. The homeostatic conception of liberty seeks
social diversity and balance in the name of individual self-
determination.
The individual builds his community from the ground up by
coming together with others who have made similar life
commitments. But self-determination is not something the state can
simply give to the individual. Not every form of social unfairness can
be alleviated in the name of self-determination without undermining
self-determination itself. In sum, there is a point where, consistent
with the central liberal idea that the self is in some sense independent
of social relations, the progressive re-structuring of society must end,
and the individual must begin. The compromise, as Madison saw,
consisted in creating the conditions of social diversity and counter-
balance. The rest is up to the individual.
